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Taxing Data
Omri Marian*
The Article offers a new theory of tax on data collection and
transmission as a primary source of government revenue. This tax
does not depend on the monetary value of data. This “data tax”
can supplement, and in some instances replace, income taxes. The
data tax can (1) mitigate some of the failures of income taxes in a
globalized data-based economy, and (2) serve to alleviate some of
the externalities of a data-based economy.
The Article advances the following four arguments. First,
current challenges to tax systems stem largely from the fact that
traditional models of taxation were designed for an economy in
which the location of labor, the ownership of capital, and the
monetary value of income were identifiable. These assumptions no
longer stand in the modern economic environment: the data
economy. Today, one the most significant sources of value creation
is the analysis, manipulation, and utilization of large quantities
of dispersed data. In so-called “data-rich markets,” source,
ownership, and value are not only hard to identify—they are not
always economically meaningful concepts.
Second, current responses to the tax challenges of the digital
economy constitute—for the most part—efforts to identify proxies
for the location in which monetary profits are created, or to
identify the owners of such profits. The results are attempts to keep
taxing the economic components of income (consumption and
savings). Instead, this Article posits that one must look again at
the normative goals of taxation, and question whether taxes on
savings and consumption are still the best functional instruments
to achieves such goals. The Article argues they are not. Income tax
is only theoretically justifiable where it is the best proxy for ability

* Professor of Law, and the Academic Director of the Graduate Tax Program,
University of California, Irvine School of Law. Helpful research assistance was provided by
Dion Diederich and David Thompson. Multiple commentators, too numerous to
individually name, provided critique and advice, and I am indebted to them all. Any errors
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511

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

to pay. In a data economy, monetary income is not necessarily the
best instrument to measure ability to pay.
Third, to address such challenges, the Article offers a
framework of tax on data collection and transmission. The tax does
not depend on the monetary value of such data. Data tax is a
suitable instrument to achieve the primary normative purposes of
taxation. Moreover, tax on data can alleviate some of the
challenges that the data economy presents to democratic
institutions.
Fourth, data tax can be designed to be fair, efficient, and
administrable. The Article offers various possible tax instrument
designs in which data (rather than savings or consumption) is the
tax base.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main ways by which governments raise revenue is
by taxing the economic components of income.1 This has been the
case since the early twentieth century.2 Assume we had the
opportunity to redesign all tax systems from scratch, behind a veil
of ignorance, knowing all that we know today about the current
global economy—would income tax still be the prevailing mode of
taxation? This Article posits it would not. Instead, “data” would be
the preferred (or at the minimum, a supplemental) tax base.
We live in an economy which is based on “data-rich markets,”3
where markets are gradually disengaging from financial capital,
data takes over some of the roles of money, and data analysis is
used to automate economic decision-making, and to predict and to
1. “On average, in 2018, OECD countries collected 34.3% of their tax revenues
through taxes on income and profits (personal and corporate income taxes taken together).”
OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 2020: TAX REVENUE TRENDS IN THE OECD 9 (2020).
2. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000) (“From its inception in the late
nineteenth century through the recent rise of payroll taxation, the welfare state has been
financed primarily through progressive income taxation.”).
3. See VICKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM
IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 10–15 (2018) (explaining the concept of data-rich markets).
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modify consumption behavior.4 In such markets, income—measured
in monetary value—is no longer the best basis for taxation.
From an economic point of view, income taxation is imposed on
the aggregation of taxpayers’ “savings” and “consumption.”5 Both
concepts rely on our ability to identify the geographical “source,”
the beneficial “ownership,” and the monetary value of income.
Source refers to “where” income is geographically created.
“Ownership” refers to who is the taxpayer that enjoys the income.6
We must identify source, ownership, and value in order to decide
who is the liable taxpayer, who gets to tax her, and to what extent.7
The rise of the global digital economy challenged these
concepts. In the age of electronic commerce, geographical source
and ownership are fluid concepts.8 Moreover, in the digital
economy, income—which is earned by the utilization of
proprietary intangibles—cannot be easily valued in monetary
terms (if at all).9 There is a widespread agreement that the global
tax system no longer fits the modern economy.10 Governments have
struggled to come up with solutions.11 Most proposed solutions are
focused on identifying new proxies for source and ownership of
income, or on ways to value intangible assets.12
The data economy exacerbates these challenges. It is not only
that “source,” “ownership,” and “monetary value” are difficult to
pinpoint in a data economy. They are not truly meaningful, even as
theoretical constructs. It makes little sense to base our main tax
instrument—the income tax—on obsolete theoretical underpinnings.
This Article offers a radical departure from the century-long tax
theory of income taxation and the legal designs it suggests. The
problem with income taxation is not its legal design. It is its very
4. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 214 (2019) (describing using data to
generate “behavioral surplus”).
5. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (describing that income
is equal to the sum of a taxpayer’s consumption and savings).
6. See discussion infra Section II.A.
7. See discussion infra Section II.A.
8. See discussion infra Section II.A.
9. See discussion infra Section II.A.
10. Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, 92 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1183, 1183 (2018).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
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nature. Income taxation, even in its optimal theoretical form, cannot
be expected to serve the underlying purposes of taxation in our
current environment. Instead, this Article offers a theory for the
taxation of “data” as a primary tax base, where the tax is divorced
from whatever monetary value “data” may (or may not) have.
When income taxes were originally designed, the world’s
economy was much simpler. Taxpayers worked where they lived
and traded mostly tangible goods.13 Corporate entities were a
rarity, and where they existed, law mandated that they be owned
and managed primarily by domestic residents and operate within
specific territories.14 There were very few corporations that
operated internationally. Under such circumstances, identifying
who owns what income, where the income was earned, and how
much, was a manageable task.
In the past century and a half or so, the world has changed
dramatically.15 We live in a global marketplace, in which dispersed
corporate entities generate value for shareholders from the creation
and utilization of intangibles.16 And the creation and utilization of
these intangible assets is relying ever more heavily on the collection
and manipulation of data. User personal data.17 Location data.18
Personal preference data.19 Speed data.20 Speech and tone data.21
Sleep data.22 Fitness data.23 Your home layout data.24 Literally any
and all data. Shoshana Zuboff suggests that we are transitioning

13. Cf. JONATHAN HASKEL & STIAN WESTLAKE, CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITAL: THE
RISE OF THE INTANGIBLE ECONOMY 24 (2018) (calling intangible investment a “sideshow” to
tangible investment in earlier years).
14. See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. For a description of the rise of the intangible economy, see HASKEL & WESTLAKE,
supra note 13, at 1–11.
17. ZUBOFF, supra note 4, at 8–12 (describing the collection of personal data of users).
18. Id. at 242–44 (describing the collection of location data of users).
19. Id. at 74–82 (describing how data collectors infer personal preferences of internet
users).
20. Id. at 213 (describing how insurers collect data on driving behavior).
21. Id. at 263–68 (describing how certain home appliances collect audio data).
22. Id. at 236–37 (describing how the Sleep Number bed and its corresponding app
collect data on users’ sleep patterns).
23. Id. at 247–50 (describing how certain applications collect data of users’ health and
fitness).
24. Id. at 235–36 (describing how automated vacuum cleaning robots document and
record home layout patterns).
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into a capitalist system that “claims human experience as free raw
material for the transition into behavioral data.”25 In our data-based
economy, data is the base ingredient used in the production of
wealth. It is a unit of account, and a medium of exchange. People
“pay” with their data for services. Data is referred to as the “new
oil”26 or even as the “new money.”27
In such an economy, “value” is not centrally sourced or even
centrally created but is the result of manipulation of massive
amounts of dispersed data,28 benefiting those who can harvest
it, manipulate it, and feed the insights back into the market in
order to guide consumption behavior. This is true not only for
“tech” companies. Even brick and mortar businesses heavily
rely on the analysis of large quantities of data to understand,
anticipate, and manipulate economic behavior.29 “Every company
has big data in its future and every company will eventually be in
the data business.”30
These economic shifts present challenges to traditional models
of taxation. In a dispersed data economy, location of income and
ownership of data mean very little. You and your data are not
severable. Even when you “transact” in your data, you get to keep
it. You just share it with others. You do not lose it. Ownership
means little in such context.
Location is similarly meaningless. What is the location of your
data once it is collected by Google? Is it where you are physically
located? Or is it where the Google servers are located? Or is it both?
Or is it where Google harnesses computing power from its
computing machines around the globe, to join your data with other
data from millions of other users, in order to generate valuable and
operational insight? What is the “location” of an algorithm, anyway?
25. Id. at 8.
26. Kiran Bhageshpur, Data Is the New Oil—and That’s a Good Thing, FORBES (Nov. 15,
2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/15/data-isthe-new-oil-and-thats-a-good-thing/?sh=598c582d7304.
27. Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 141 (2019) (“Data, it is
often said, [is] the new money.”).
28. See HASKEL & WESTLAKE, supra note 13, at 5–11.
29. LESLIE BRADSHAW, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. FOUND., BIG DATA AND THE CHANGE IT
BRINGS 1 (2013) (stating that “Big Data is already an integral part of every sector in the global
economy,” including “manufacturing, finance, and especially retail”).
30. Thomas H. Davenport, What’s So Big About Big Data?, RACONTEUR (June 12, 2012),
https://www.raconteur.net/whats-so-big-about-big-data/.
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Your data also has no monetary value on its own. What is the
nominal dollar value of knowing your name? Or address? Your
data only becomes valuable once combined with billions of other
pieces of data of other individuals. Or it becomes valuable when
combined with data that does not “belong” to anyone. Think, for
example, of weather patterns. In and of themselves, they are
valueless. But they become valuable if they are somehow joined
with your location data to convince you to buy an umbrella.
Data only becomes valuable when it is manipulated, and insights
are used to anticipate and modify your consumption behavior.
It becomes even more valuable when feedback data is used to
assess the success of such manipulations and to better affect
behavioral modifications.31
In the past few decades, savvy multinational taxpayers were
quick to identify tax saving opportunities and structure their affairs
in a way that creates income that is produced “nowhere,” or
belongs to “no one.”32 This puts significant budgetary strains on the
democratic welfare state.33 As a result, we have seen a gradual,
decades-long shift from governments’ reliance on capital taxation
for revenue to taxing less mobile income (mostly by taxing salaries
and end-consumer sales). This has shifted much of the tax burden
from high-income earners to low- and middle-income earners.34
The data economy has the potential to make even “labor”
taxation disappear with the advent of artificial intelligence. Some
argue that artificial intelligence will eventually replace most of the
work force.35 In such a case, without “labor,” what is left to tax?
Even if artificial intelligence does not “replace” labor per se, it
certainly makes it harder to identify the places where actual labor
happens and the unique value contribution of labor. If workers rely

31. ZUBOFF, supra note 4, at 305–07 (describing the use of feedback loops to modify
users’ behaviors).
32. See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave
Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016) (discussing Apple’s
international corporate structure, which allowed it to allocate profits in such a way that it
was immune from taxation in many countries).
33. Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1578.
34. See id. at 1576 (“However, greater capital mobility and international tax
competition allow investors to escape taxation easily by shifting capital to low- or no-tax
jurisdictions. Consequently, the income tax’s progressive effect is significantly weakened.”).
35. For a discussion of such arguments, see BYRON REESE, THE FOURTH AGE: SMART
ROBOTS, CONSCIOUS COMPUTERS, AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 83–92 (2018).

517

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

ever more heavily on assistance of algorithms in their job
performance, how much of the value creation is attributable to the
worker, and how much to the supporting algorithm? And where is
value created when we rely on algorithms in our everyday work?
The fact that we tax labor more than capital may be problematic
enough on its own. What happens if we cannot even tax labor?
The data economy offers an additional important challenge to
the modern state, beyond the revenue challenge. It challenges the
foundation of democracy. Data is not equally owned, shared, or
used to generate economic benefits. The so-called “data economy”
is exceptionally concentrated in the hands of the few. A small
number of corporations collect, control, and transact in most data.36
A small number of individuals guide the behavior of these
corporations. The accumulation of data in the hands of a few large
corporations,37 which seek to use such accumulation for monetary
profits, creates “instrumentarian power [that] exceed[s] the historical
norms of capitalist ambitions, claiming dominion over human,
societal, and political territories that range far beyond the
conventional institutional terrain of the private firm or the market.”38
For several decades now, governments have been engaged in
attempts to address these challenges. For example, addressing the
so-called “tax challenges of the digital economy” has been a main
focus of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).39 Multiple innovative models of taxation have been
offered, such as new ways to allocate income between jurisdictions
involved in cross-border transactions, a multitude of new antiabuse rules, new taxes on digital services, taxes on robots,
“destination-based” taxes, taxes on “excess profits,” and the list

36. Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
275, 275 (2018).
37. The use of data to generate economic surplus is concentrated in the hands of a very
few corporations. For a description of these market monopolies, see ZUBOFF, supra note 4, at
130–37.
38. Id. at 21. The democratic challenge is discussed below. See discussion infra Section
II.B.3.
39. Nana Ama Sarfo, How the OECD Became the World’s Tax Leader, FORBES (Aug. 11,
2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2020/08/11/how-the-oecdbecame-the-worlds-tax-leader/?sh=3ec6dd806628 (describing OECD BEPS plan to address
the tax challenges of the digital economy).
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goes on. But to date there does not seem to be a consensus (or even
a broad agreement) on what the future of taxation should look like.
This Article posits that unlike our economic reality, tax
models—even the new innovative tax models—remained
theoretically stagnant. All these new attempts to come up with new
ways of taxation share the same tax policy aim: they all still
represent various attempts to tax the components of economic
income measured in monetary terms. This, for the most part, is a result
of necessary political compromise. These attempts to save income
taxation should not be abandoned. But they should, at the
minimum, be supplemented by rethinking how we tax in the first
place. We designed income tax in a different reality. Should we still
tax income (or mostly income) in our new reality?
No. We should not. There is no standalone normative
justification for the taxation of income. Income tax was designed
merely as an instrument to achieve the primary normative
purposes of taxation: funding governments in an efficient and
equitable manner. Using income as the tax base achieved such
purposes in the end of the nineteenth century. It made sense then.
It probably made significant sense until the 1980s or so. For a large
part of the economy, it does not make sense anymore. In the age of
data capitalism, we should tax data.
A well-designed tax on the collection and transmission of data
saves the need to identify the “source” of value creation. It also
saves the need to identify the beneficial owner of monetary gain. It
completely avoids the insurmountable task of trying to assess the
“monetary value” of data. Tax on data can be designed to be
equitable and efficient.40
Moreover, tax on data can alleviate some of the threats the data
economy poses to society.41 The data economy infringes upon
users’ autonomy, creates economic oligopolies, and even raises
environmental concerns.42 It challenges democratic institutions.43
Certain tax instruments can alleviate such externalities.44 Congress
did use taxes in the past to counter anti-democratic societal
processes. For example, Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah explicitly
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See discussion infra Section I.A.
See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
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argues that the United States corporate tax was adopted in 1909
partly to counter the concentration of power with corporate
managers during the age of corporate consolidation.45 Imposing tax
on data will alleviate similar concerns in an age where data is
power. The revenue from such tax can also be used to remedy some
of the negative consequences of the data economy.
This Article continues as follows. Part I discusses the basic
normative underpinning of taxation, and briefly explains the
historical background that led to the global popularity of income
tax as the revenue measure of choice. Part II explains the historical
processes of globalization, dispersion, and digitalization—
culminating in the data economy—that made the income tax
somewhat obsolete and presented significant other challenges to
the modern nation state. This Part also explains how the rise of the
data economy exacerbated such challenges and made them
qualitatively different. Part III outlines the myriad current
responses to the tax challenges of the digital economy. The
argument is that all such proposed solutions keep trying to identify
proxies for income in an economy where income is no longer the
best theoretical instrument for taxation. Part IV offers an alternative
in the form of tax on data collection and transmission. This Part also
considers several possible designs of tax on data.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE RISE OF INCOME TAXATION
This Part briefly explains how income taxation became the
prevalent mode of government funding. It starts by explaining the
very basic considerations of tax policy design. It then explains the
historical rise of individual income taxation and corporate income
taxation as responses to the societal challenges of the nineteenth
century.
A. The Basics of Tax Policy Choices
We tax in order to fund government.46 That is not a controversial
statement. Rather, policy controversies arise when we question

45. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2004).
46. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE
OVER TAXES 13–15 (2008) (explaining different taxes as sources of government revenue).
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how we should design tax law, and the extent to which we want to
fund government.47
Commonly, there are three competing primary normative
considerations in the design of a tax system: efficiency, equity, and
administrability.48 One’s preference for a specific tax design largely
reflects ideological preference for one normative value over others.
“Efficiency” considerations reflect the common understanding
that tax has “disincentive effects.”49 Taxpayers’ economic
behaviors—such as how much to work, which assets to invest in,
when and where to invest—are different in an environment with
taxes than they would have been in an environment without taxes.
An “efficient” tax system is one that adequately funds government
while minimizing distortions in economic behavior.
A flat poll tax is an example of a very efficient tax. It is difficult
to avoid, is unaffected by the taxpayer’s economic decisions, and is
easy to administer.50 But a poll tax is not equitable. An “equitable”
(or “fair”) tax system is one that takes into consideration the
individual circumstances of each taxpayer when determining her
tax burdens.51 In popular terms, such tax system requires taxpayers
to contribute their “fair share” to government revenue, based on
their so-called “ability to pay.”52 Researchers identify the
theoretical bases of fairness considerations as “vertical equity” and
“horizontal equity.”53 Vertical equity is achieved when taxpayers’
tax burdens correlate with their well-being.54 Affluent taxpayers
should carry a higher overall tax burden than poor taxpayers.
Horizontal equity questions “under what, if any, circumstances it
is acceptable that two equally well-off households bear a different
tax burden.”55

47. Id. at 3–7 (outlining the main controversies related to the tax system).
48. There are other secondary considerations in tax policy, such as guiding behavior
and impose costs on specific behaviors (so-called “Pigouvian taxes”). For a discussion, see
Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigouvian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1682–90
(2015) (discussing the theory and design of Pigouvian Taxes).
49. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 66.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See discussion infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
53. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 59–60.
54. See id. at 59.
55. See id. at 60.
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In theory, one could imagine a tax system that takes into
account every possible aspect of each taxpayer’s existence to apply
a perfectly adjusted individual tax burden. Even if we set aside the
obvious worry about how much we want governments to know
about us, such system would be impossible to administer and
difficult to comply with. Thus, one must also consider the issue of
administrability of a tax system.
In the context of tax policymaking, “administrability” can be
described as the principle under which “societies ought to be able
to enforce the tax systems they create.”56 There is more to this than
simple administrative convenience. Administrability is a normative
value in and of itself. For example, there are negative ramifications
to rule of law principles if a tax law is designed in a way that is
impossible for government to enforce or for taxpayers to comply
with.57 There is also a normative agency element here, as
“governments have duties as agents of societies to practice careful
management of resources entrusted to them.”58 Failing such
fiduciary capacity will harm public trust in government. Moreover,
administrability directly affects the two other normative
considerations: efficiency and fairness. A complex tax system may
create efficiency losses as it offers many opportunities to “game the
system.” Taxpayers’ economic decisions may be dictated by their
ability to navigate loopholes rather than by a business rationale.
Complex systems also create compliance costs which, from an
efficiency point of view, are a waste.
From an equity point of view, a complex system may offer
planning opportunities for rich taxpayers who can pay lawyers
and accountants to navigate the system in a way poor taxpayers
cannot. On the other hand, a too-simplistic tax system is also
obviously unfair as it may be over- or under-inclusive, as in the case
of a poll tax.
These normative considerations have underlined tax law
design in modern times. The next section discusses how such
considerations brought about the tax instruments we have today.

56. ALLISON CHRISTIANS, INTRODUCTION TO TAX POLICY THEORY 23 (2018) (emphasis
omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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B. The Rise of the Modern Income Tax
Income taxation of business entities and individuals present
different challenges and have their own unique histories. I
therefore discuss each separately.
1. Individual income taxation
At the end of the nineteenth century, almost all federal revenue
in the United States came from duties, excise taxes, customs, and
tariffs levied on a broad list of goods.59 In 1880, these levies
accounted for 90% of all national receipts.60 The United States was
not exceptional. Many nineteenth-century industrializing nations
also turned to tariffs, customs, duties, and excise taxes to fund their
public outlays.61
These taxes were immensely unpopular.62 U.S. tariffs were
“initially used mainly as a geo-political tool to combat British naval
imperialism.”63 But late nineteenth-century industrialization led to
a significant increase in international commerce and turned tariffs
to instruments of favoritism, designed to “protect domestic
industries” from overseas competition.64 Stated in tax-policy design

59. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 3–4 (2003) (describing
consumption taxes at the end of the nineteenth century in the United States).
60. Id. at 7.
61. See, e.g., Brian J. Arnold, Canada, in COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 27, 27 (Hugh J. Ault & Brian K. Arnold eds., 3d ed. 2010) (“Until
[1917], the major sources of federal revenue were customs and excise taxes.”); Minoru
Nakazato, Mark Ramseyer & Yasutaka Nishikori, Japan, in COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION,
supra, at 93 (“Prior to [1887], Japanese national revenues had been heavily dependent on the
land tax and the liquor tax.”); Kees van Raad, The Netherlands, in COMPARATIVE INCOME
TAXATION, supra, at 111 (“Most of these [pre-1892] taxes were excise taxes . . . .”); Peter Melz,
Sweden, in COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra, at 129 (describing the gradual transition
from excise tax to income tax as a main source of government revenue in nineteenth-century
Sweden).
62. MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 37–39 (describing Thomas E. Cooley’s scathing
criticism of the American tax system, which “typified the prevailing view of American
taxation” during Cooley’s day).
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id.
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terms, such taxes are immensely inefficient, as they distort market
prices, investment decisions, and consumption decisions.65
Tariffs and excise taxes were also unpopular because they are
inequitable, with much of the burden falling on low- and middleincome taxpayers.66 Excise taxes, for the most part, are simply
transaction-based taxes where the tax burden falls on the end
user.67 They are usually set at a flat rate, which makes them
regressive. Wealthy taxpayers, on the other hand, were popularly
perceived to be largely beyond the reach of these levies.68 Since
poor taxpayers consume most of their income, and rich taxpayers
save much of their income, excise taxes—as a share of taxpayer’s
income—excessively burden low-income taxpayers.69
The failures of the late nineteenth-century system of taxation—
both in terms of efficiency and equity—manifested themselves as
substantial scholarly interest in tax theories. Until then, most tax
scholars viewed taxation simply as “the price that individual
citizens paid in exchange for the benefits of government
protection.”70 Similar reasoning was applied in the context of
government services71—meaning, taxes are the price one pays for
government benefits such as defense, education, healthcare,
utilities, transportation, and so on. This justification of taxation—
known as the “benefits principle”—gradually fell from favor given
the failures of the types of taxes it led to.72 Today, the benefits
65. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 139 (describing a tariff as “a particularly
inefficient tax from the perspective of the country that imposes it because it induces its residents
to buy domestically produced goods that could be obtained more cheaply by importing”).
66. See, e.g., STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 40–41 (2010) (describing the progressivity and the
unpopularity of early excise taxes and tariffs); MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 41–45 (same).
67. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 618 (1902) (defining an excise tax as “an indirect tax
on the consumer, levied upon certain specified articles, as tobacco, ale, spirits, etc., grown or
manufactured in the country”).
68. BANK, supra note 66, at 41–45; see also KIMBERLY CLAUSING, OPEN: THE PROGRESSIVE
CASE FOR FREE TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND GLOBAL CAPITAL (2019).
69. Who Bears the Burden of Federal Excise Taxes?, TAX POL’Y CTR. BRIEFING BOOK,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/who-bears-burden-federal-excise-taxes
(last updated May 2020).
70. MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 61.
71. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 62–64.
72. MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 62–67 (describing the early scholarly critiques of
benefits theory); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 63 (concluding that “the benefit
principle fails to offer practical guidelines about how the tax burden should be distributed”).
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principle is no longer the main theoretical underpinning for tax law
design. The main critiques of the benefits theory are that it is
(1) impossible to administer (how do we determine national
defense’s value to a single individual?) and (2) incoherent with a
modern welfare state, in which some taxpayers are intended to be
net recipients of government services while others are net payers.73
During the late nineteenth century, a new school of political
economy emerged which—shaped by the economic experience of
the period—was “inclined . . . toward social change,”74 seeking to
move “the existing tax system in the direction of greater justice.”75
Scholars of this new school agreed that “benefits theory provided
an inconsistent and hence incoherent intellectual basis for creating
a modern tax system.”76 Instead, the “ability to pay” principle
became the theoretical basis for the new social order.77 The ability
to pay principle suggests that one’s tax burden should relate to
one’s “ability to bear the sacrifice of material well-being a tax burden
entails.”78 The ability to pay principle became the theoretical
bedrock for designing the modern progressive income tax.
To design a tax system adhering to “ability to pay,” we need a
way to measure this “ability,”79 in order to decide the extent to
which one would have to pay in tax out of her total ability.
“Ability,” however, is not a measurable economic term that
offers objective benchmarks for one’s well-being. The measurement
of “ability” must rely on proxies. During the early twentieth
century, income (measured in terms of monetary value) emerged
as a preferred proxy for ability to pay,80 and taxes on income

Slemrod and Bakija suggest, however, that the benefit principle may provide a general
justification for progressive taxation, since “households with higher income and wealth have
more to lose . . . if the government withdrew from providing defense . . . [and] should
therefore carry a higher tax burden.” Id.
73. Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and
Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 399 (2005).
74. MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 101.
75. Id. at 116 (quoting Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 610, 610 (1894)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 114.
78. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 64.
79. Dodge, supra note 73, at 449 (defining “‘objective ability to pay,’ meaning that
ability to pay is measured in nominal dollars (rather than subjective utility) on a year-to-year
basis and ignores nonalienable endowments”).
80. MEHROTRA, supra note 59, at 150, 185.
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“became institutionalized as . . . socially and culturally legitimate
mass tax[es].”81
Income is economically defined as the “value of the goods and
services you consume during a year, plus the net change in your
wealth (saving) that occurs in that year.”82 Known as the SchanzHaig-Simons model, income is formally stated as I = C + ΔS, where
I is income, C is the value spent in consumption, and S is savings
(the net assets one owns).83
Of course, an actual legal design will often deviate from this
easy formula for various policy purposes. An obvious example is
the “realization doctrine,” which requires that income be “realized”
(short for converted into liquid cash or other assets).84 Nonetheless,
the Schanz-Haig-Simons model still serves as the economic
benchmark for measuring income, and deviations from it represent
tax policy preferences.85
Once income is measured, tax writers must come up with a
legal design ensuring that taxpayers who are better-off indeed pay
“more.” There are many ways one might design a “progressive” tax
system, but the most common method used is increasing the tax
rate as income itself increases.86
When the income tax system was born, this design made a lot
of sense. Most people earned money in their individual capacities.
Corporations were a rare creation, which required state
legislation.87 In this pre-globalized, pre-corporate world, people
81. Id. at 15.
82. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 28.
83. Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1–28 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921); SIMONS, supra note 5, at 41–58.
84. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 46, at 35–36.
85. A note of clarification is in order here. “Income taxes” are frequently contrasted
with “consumption taxes” in tax policy discussion. For a summary of the tax policy
discussion juxtaposing consumption versus income taxes, see, for example, Joseph Bankman
& David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006). However, as evident from the Schanz-Haig-Simons model,
“consumption” is part of the definition of “income.” The difference between income tax and
consumption tax is that the income tax base also includes “savings,” namely the return from
capital investment. While this difference in policy is significant, it is not the main focus of
this Article. For the rest of the Article, taxes on “consumption” are simply viewed as one
economic component of the “income tax” (the other being tax on “savings”). The Article
notes the importance of taxing “savings” where relevant.
86. This is how most progressive income tax systems work. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1.
87. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 45–46 (2006).
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generally traveled little, worked where they lived, and locally
traded or invested in tangible goods. Even corporate stock came in
barer, tangible form.88 It was easy to tell who earned what income,
where, and how much. The measurement of the tax base did not
introduce very significant administration challenges. It worked.
2. Corporate income taxation
There are two acceptable historical reasonings for the taxation
of corporate income. One suggests that corporate taxation was
originally adopted in 190989 “as a substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing
corporate shareholders directly.”90 Even before 1909, Congress
imposed specific taxes on companies in highly consolidated
industries such as transportation, banking, and insurance.91 With
the proliferation of general incorporation laws during the second
half of the nineteenth century, corporations came to dominate most
businesses, making the industry-specific approach inadequate.92
Congress made a first attempt to tax corporations in 1894, in an act
understood by historians as a first explicit federal attempt to
systemically get at shareholders’ wealth through the taxation of
corporations.93 The 1894 Act was struck down by the Supreme
Court,94 but general taxation of all corporate entities was
reintroduced in the 1909 Act. The 1909 Act was evidently tailored
to withstand constitutional challenges, but still was a mechanism to
get at shareholders’ wealth.95 Under this theory, corporate taxation
was simply another functional instrument to tax based on the
“ability to pay” of the eventual corporate equity holders.

88. George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 232 (2018).
89. See Corporate Tax Act of 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
90. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001) [hereinafter Bank, Origins of the Corporate Income Tax]; see
also Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the U.S. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, in 2 STUDIES
IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 393 (John Tiley ed., 2007) [hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory as a
Myth in the U.S. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909].
91. See Bank, Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, supra note 90, at 504–05.
92. See id. at 505–08 (describing the dramatic increase in doing business through a
corporate form toward the end of the nineteenth century).
93. Id. at 462 (noting that “[t]he simultaneous income taxation of individuals and
corporations was unprecedented as the federal level”).
94. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
95. Bank, Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, supra note 90, at 532.
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A second historical theory of corporate tax posits that the 1909
Act reflected negative sentiment in Congress toward large-scale
business entities,96 which accumulated substantial power in the age
of corporate consolidation. Influential corporate managements
were identified as a source of abuse of power.97 It had therefore
been suggested that “the imposition of the corporate tax would
enable the government, the shareholders and the public to obtain
information that will serve as the basis for restricting such
managerial abuses of power.”98 Under this approach, the 1909 Act
was an attempt to restrict excessive corporate power, which is
incompatible with democratic governance.99
Whichever theory one might prefer, both could serve as a
reasonable normative justification for the taxation of corporate
income when first introduced. During much of the nineteenth
century, states enjoyed “territorial monopolies on corporate
law.”100 Incorporation was not freely available. Rather, corporate
charters were granted by special legislative acts of the states.101
Consistent with such notion, “it was generally understood that a
corporation’s legal standing reached only to the borders of the
incorporating state” and that “a corporation existed only within the
borders of the sovereign that created it.”102 Consequently, it was
accepted that a corporation, as a separate entity, “[could] not be
taxed except by the State which created it,”103 and that states could
tax “foreign” corporations only on “[t]he privilege of acting” within
the taxing state’s territory.104 Moreover, corporations had limited
geographical reach. “Businesses transacted primarily in local
product, labor, and capital markets, and rarely had operations out-

96. Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S.
Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 510 (2010);
Bank, Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, supra note 90, at 508–11.
97. Avi-Yonah, supra note 45, at 1219–20 (citing President Taft Message to Congress,
44 Cong. Rec. 3344 (1909)).
98. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted in 1909?, in 2 STUDIES
IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW, supra note 90, at 377, 383.
99. Id. at 382–87.
100. Tung, supra note 87, at 46.
101. Mehrorta, supra note 96, at 515.
102. Tung, supra note 87, at 54.
103. JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 462, at 619 (1904).
104. Id. at 620.

528

529

Taxing Data

of-state.”105 State-level corporate taxation had even been justified,
among other reasons, on administrative grounds, noting the
advantage of the state over the federal government in taxing locally
operated businesses.106
It is not only the case that state-chartered businesses happened
to operate locally by the nature of their business,107 but it has also
been required by many states’ laws. “Corporations and legislatures
expected—and
legislatures
sometimes
mandated—that
corporations would have significant operations in the
incorporating state, that officers and directors would be residents
of that state, and that shareholders’ and directors’ meetings would
be held in the state.”108
Under such set of circumstances, it was perfectly sensible to use
corporate taxation as an instrument to measure corporate owners’
“ability to pay.” Payouts from a company of a state could have been
assumed to be burdening income earned in that state, owned by
residents living in that state.
The same can be said about federal-level corporate tax. During
the late nineteenth century, U.S. businesses were overwhelmingly
focused on U.S. local markets, which provided a “continental size”
consumer base for their products.109 The economic opportunities of
scale could be all exploited with no need to look to foreign markets.
American companies thus “tended to invest in their [own]
backyard[],”110 and the United States only played a minor role in
global trade.111 Even with U.S. exports steadily increasing during

105. Tung, supra note 87, at 46; see also Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise
of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 107 (1955) (noting
that until 1880 the U.S. economy was “typified by small single-plant companies serving
limited markets”).
106. Mehrorta, supra note 96, at 516.
107. Tung, supra note 87, at 56 (“[F]irms ordinarily incorporated in the state where their
organizers resided and where their major operations were located.”) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 56–57.
109. MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, THE RISE OF MODERN BUSINESS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE
UNITED STATES, GERMANY, JAPAN, AND CHINA 87 (3d ed. 2008).
110. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 164 (2003); see also LANCE E. DAVIS & ROBERT J. CULL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1820–1914, at 79–91
(1994) (discussing the insignificance of foreign investment by U.S. investors between 1797
and 1896).
111. Robert E. Lipsey, U.S. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800–1913, at 5
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 4710, 1994).
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the nineteenth century, the United States remained a net-capital
importer until the end of the century.112 Even amid positive inflow
of investment, up until the early twentieth century (when the 1909
Act became functional), foreign investment in the United States did
not play a significant role in U.S. economic growth.113 Thus, it
would seem plausible to argue that taxing U.S. corporate entities
was a good proxy to tax income earned in the United States, by
U.S. residents.
The historical circumstances also support the “democratic
argument” for corporate taxation. During the second half of the
nineteenth century, an increasing number of states neglected the
model of state-chartered corporations in favor of general
incorporation laws.114 Local business entrepreneurs were quick to
take advantage of the liberalization of corporate laws, and “by 1904
corporations accounted for three-quarters of the United States’
industrial output.”115 Between the 1890s and the early 1900s, the
U.S. economy underwent an unprecedented wave of
consolidations, resulting in the separation of management from
control.116 This period saw the institutionalization of managerial
capitalism, namely the rise of professional, hierarchical salaried
management at the expense of personal management by owners.117
The wave of consolidations engulfing the United States starting
in the 1890s may have changed ownership structures of U.S.
corporations. However, it apparently did not change the national
identity of the corporations’ owners and managers, nor did it
change the geographical source of the corporations’ income. The
consolidation movement was horizontal in nature. It was
characterized by the amalgamation of multiple small and medium

112. Id. at 10.
113. DAVIS & CULL, supra note 110, at 111.
114. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 135–37 (1933) (describing the erosion of centralized ownership structure
in parallel to adoption of general corporate laws in multiple states).
115. See BLACKFORD, supra note 109, at 87.
116. PAUL FRENTROP, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1602–2002, at 192–94
(Ted Alkins trans., 2002); Navin & Sears, supra note 105; Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment
and Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of
1897
to
1903,
at
6–10
(Dec.
15,
2002)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2x90s8bc (describing the corporate merger wave of the
late nineteenth century).
117. Mehrotra, supra note 96, at 524.

530

531

Taxing Data

businesses in the same industry into trusts, and later to holding
companies.118 Owners of the “old” family businesses ceded
management rights to some form of central management, but
generally did not relinquish their ownership.119 The result was the
diffusion of ownership, but the centralization of management.120
Thus, the transformation was from a situation in which many U.S.
individuals owned and managed many U.S.-incorporated
corporations, to a situation in which many U.S. individuals owned
or managed few U.S.-incorporated corporations that earned
income in the United States. Thus, it made sense to target
managerial power through corporate taxation.
At the dawn of corporate taxation, the corporate world was
localized and managerially centralized. Thus, whether the attempt
was to target shareholders’ ability to pay, or managerial interest,
the taxation of corporate income made sense.
II. TRADITIONAL INCOME TAX DESIGNS MEET THE NEW ECONOMY
This Part starts by identifying three historical processes that
challenge the traditional model of taxation, all of which preceded
the data economy: globalization, dispersion, and the decline of
tangible capital, or “intangible-ization” of the economy. Each of
these processes challenges the traditional underpinnings of income
tax design: source, ownership, and monetary value. These
challenges are all exacerbated by the rise of the data economy,
which effectively combines these challenges at scale. The data
economy not only makes source, ownership, and value difficult to
identify—it makes them theoretically meaningless for income tax
design. As such, they can no longer serve as underlying
instruments to identify one’s “ability to pay.”

118. For a description of the U.S. horizontal consolidation movement at the end of the
nineteenth century, see, for example, FRENTROP, supra note 116, at 192–94; Navin & Sears,
supra note 105; Cheffins, supra note 116, at 12 (“One key constituency which remained when
a turn-of-the-century merger had been concluded was composed of the owners of the
formerly autonomous firms encompassed within the consolidation. This was because of the
merger package typically offered to incumbents with an industry.”).
119. FRENTROP, supra note 116, at 193.
120. Cheffins, supra note 116, at 10–11.
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A. The Three Modern Tax Challenges of Income Tax: Globalization,
Dispersion, and Intangible-ization
1. Globalization
During the nineteenth century, growth in international trade
introduced the potential of competing tax claims by multiple
jurisdictions over the same streams of income. In the early 1920s,
the League of Nations appointed a Committee of Experts to
develop principles for the prevention of double taxation. The most
influential work of the Committee of Experts was a 1923 report
drafted by the four economists of the Committee.121
The 1923 report established that “[t]he classification and
assignment of specific categories of income to source or residence
should be determined by an objective test, ‘economic
allegiance.’”122 The “source” of income refers to the territorial
boundaries of the jurisdiction in which income is created. The
“residence” jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the beneficial
owner of the income is resident for tax purposes. Some
commentators have suggested that the principles proposed by the
1923 report provide, to this day, the foundational features for the
taxation of cross-border transactions.123 Indeed, to this day, the
allocation of taxing rights between the source and residence
jurisdiction remains the essential element of international tax
policy.124 These principles suggest that “active income” should be
taxed mostly at the source jurisdiction, while “passive income”125
should be taxed mostly at the residence jurisdiction.126

121. Report Submitted to the Financial Committee on Double Taxation, League of Nations
Doc. E.F.S.73. F.19 (1923). The four economists are Edwin Seligman of the United States,
Professor Luigi Einaudi of Italy, Professor G. W. J. Bruins of the Netherlands, and Sir Josiah
Stamp of Great Britain.
122. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1076 (1997) (emphasis added).
123. Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International
Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 567 (1992); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301,
1303–06 (1996).
124. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 3 (2007) (explaining the two principles).
125. Id. at 53.
126. Id.
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In the years leading up to the drafting of the 1923 report, these
principles made much sense. Both components of income—savings
and consumption—were relativity immobile. In an age of tangible
production and tangible commerce, it was easy to identify the
country of the source of income, as well as the country of residence
of the income owner. Economic competition was largely focused on
local markets.
But the explosion of international commerce during the
twentieth century changed that. The “[l]iberalization of trade,
commercial, and financial flows increase[d] pressures on states to
make their tax regimes appeal to highly mobile business and
investment.”127 Developed countries responded to these
competitive pressures “first, by shifting the tax burden from
(mobile) capital to (less mobile) labor, and second, when increased
taxation of labor has become politically and economically
problematic, by reducing the social safety net.”128 This confluence
of events created what Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah described as
“the fiscal crisis of the welfare state.”129 “If developed countries are
unable to tax income from capital and if alternative taxes are not
feasible, their only recourse is to cut the social safety net.”130
Another effect of globalization is the transcendence of “tax
arbitrage.” Tax arbitrage refers to the ability of taxpayers to take
advantage of differences in tax law among jurisdiction involved in
a cross-border transaction. This allows return on capital from crossborder investment to easily escape taxation. This may not have
been a major issue in a localized economy but is one of the defining
issues of taxation of a global economy where multiple domestic
laws constantly interact.131
Consider, for example, “debt/equity arbitrage.”132 Assume
Parent corporation invests in another jurisdiction through a
subsidiary organized in the jurisdiction—Sub. Parent finances Sub
with a financing instrument known as a CPEC (convertible

127. Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353, 357 (2020).
128. Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1576.
129. Id. at 1632.
130. Id. at 1578.
131. OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION
2: 2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015).
132. For a discussion of debt/equity arbitrage, see Omri Marian, The State
Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (2017).
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preferred equity certificate).133 Under the laws of Parent’s
jurisdiction, CPECs are classified as equity; thus, payment on the
CPECs to Parent are considered dividends. Most countries in the
world do not tax dividends received by parents from foreign
subsidiaries.134 What if, however, under the laws of Sub’s
jurisdiction, CPECs are classified as debt? This means the payments
on the CPECs are classified as deductible interest payments to Sub.
Sub gets to reduce its income through deductible payments, which
are not taxed to Parent. The result is that Sub’s earnings are taxed
nowhere.135 Such planning techniques are not available to wage
earners, who live, earn, and pay tax in a single jurisdiction. But such
planning is available to international capital investors.
Globalization’s main challenge to the traditional models of
taxation is divorcing the components of income taxation from one
another. Taxing capital and taxing labor became distinctively
different undertakings. Affluent taxpayers, who make much (if not
most) of their income from capital investment,136 face steadily
decreasing effective tax rates, while wage earners face steadily
increasing tax rates.137 The system becomes less progressive over
time. Thomas Piketty’s seminal work, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century, empirically documents the process of increased inequality
with the rise of globalization.138 Papers by Emmanuel Saez and
Gabriel Zucman show similar trends.139 In tax policy terms,
133. For a discussion of CPECs, see id. at 32–33.
134. Under a “participation exemption” regime, dividends received by domestic
parent corporations from their foreign subsidiaries are exempt at the parent’s jurisdiction
of residence.
135. This form of planning was rampant until recently, when a whistleblower leak
exposed the immense magnitude of such planning and brought about legal changes. For a
discussion of tax-related whistleblower leaks that brought about legal reforms, see Shu-Yi
Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018).
136. See Philip Stallworth, Let Me Tell You About the Very Rich. They Are Different from
You and Me, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/letme-tell-you-about-very-rich-they-are-different-you-and-me.
137. Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1577 (“If much of both passive and productive income
from capital can escape the tax net, the income tax becomes in effect a tax on labor.”).
138. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2017) (2013).
139. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality
in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall
2020, at 3 (finding that between 1978 and 2018, the share of pre-tax income earned by the top
1% rose from 10% to about 19%, and the share of wealth owned by the top 0.1% rose from
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globalization brought about tax competition, which in turn caused
a shift from taxing capital income to taxing labor income. This
makes the system significantly less equitable.
Such a global income tax system also has obvious efficiency
costs. Instead of straightforward corporate structures, taxpayers
come up with convoluted structures with the intention of taking
advantage of tax planning opportunities. The result is less than
optimal financing structures, choice of jurisdictions, and choice of
business entities.
2. Dispersion
As noted above, when income taxes were originally designed,
corporate ownership was a rarity.140 Corporate charters were
granted by special legislative acts of the states. Corporations
operated almost exclusively locally, and states had significant
control over corporate actions.141
The functional consequence was that it was easy to identify the
location of both corporate ownership and corporate management.
Consider ownership—business owners either owned their business
directly or through concentrated corporate structures. It was very
easy to tell who was the beneficial owner of corporate earnings.
The liberalization of corporate laws, separation of corporate
ownership from corporate control,142 and the diffusion of the
corporate ownership shifted significant control to corporate
managers. This explains the introduction of corporate tax, at least
in part, as an attempt to curtail managerial power.143 But at the
beginning of the twentieth century, management was still
centralized. It was rather easy to identify where a corporation was
managed from. Indeed, multiple countries adopted legal tests that
7% to about 18%); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519 (2016) (finding
increase in wealth inequality in recent decades is due to the upsurge of top incomes
combined with an increase in saving rate inequality).
140. See Tung, supra note 87, at 47 (“[C]orporate charters were granted only sparingly,
one-by-one, through special acts of state legislatures.”).
141. Cheffins, supra note 116, at 4 (“As the 19th century was drawing to a close, family
control of industrial enterprises was the norm in the United States and there were only very
rare examples of companies with widely dispersed shareholdings and well-developed
managerial hierarchies.”).
142. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 114.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03.

535

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

determined the place of corporate “tax residence” based on “the
place of effective management,” or the place of “central
management and control.”144
But this is also a bygone era. Dispersion is common not only in
corporate ownership. Rather, dispersion defines all other functions
of the modern multinational corporate entity. “The archetypal
multinational ﬁrm with a particular national identity and a
corporate headquarters ﬁxed in one country is becoming obsolete
as ﬁrms continue to maximise the opportunities created by global
markets.”145 Globalization and the increased mobility of capital
allowed specialization within a company, enabling multinational
corporations to utilize different jurisdictions’ comparative
advantages for specific functions within the firm.146 This brought
about a global fragmentation of the supply chains, which in turn
led to the outsourcing of value-creating activities.147 For example,
Apple’s iPhones are not manufactured by Apple, but by third-party
contractors.148 “Contract manufacturing” is a prevalent method of
making consumer goods in the world today.
Firms no longer have a “home” where they reside, nor a clearly
identified location where they create value. Firm “homes are now
being separated and reallocated advantageously and the home for
managerial talent can itself be served by many locations.”149 Value
is created by multiple interactions between related entities and by
outsourcing many value-creating functions to unrelated entities.
Under such circumstances, explaining corporate income
taxation as a functional instrument to tax corporate owners or
managers is a tenuous argument. When the owners are dispersed
and management functions are decentralized, there is no
substantively meaningful corporate “home” that would justify
corporate residence-based taxation. Indeed, the concept of
“corporate residence” has been harshly criticized as lacking any
144. Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1643 (2013).
145. Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271, 1271 (2009).
146. Id. at 1275–76.
147. Id. at 1275 (“[I]f my activities are spread around the world in this way, do I need
to own all of them? With outsourcing, ﬁrms contract with outside firms for some activities
and only the most central activities remain within the ownership chain.”).
148. See Patrick Moorhead, Who Are Apple’s iPhone Contract Manufacturers?, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmoorhead/2019/
04/13/who-are-apples-iphone-contract-manufacturers/?sh=53ee49334e6d.
149. Desai, supra note 145, at 1276.
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normative underpinning.150 As a practical matter, smart tax lawyers
made the location of corporate tax residence “elective.”151 Under
such circumstances, it is difficult to find the tax residence of a
corporation to still be a meaningful tax policy instrument.
Similarly, “source taxation” in the context of corporate entities
seems equally meaningless. When “value creation” is fragmented,
outsourced, and facilitated through a multitude of intercompany
transactions between affiliated companies, there is also little we can
do to clearly identify “where” a corporation earns its income.152
Does Apple create value where its research facilities are located?
Where the third-party manufacturing facilities are? Where its
marketing teams are located? In Apple stores? The answer is
probably all of these places. But allocating the taxing rights between
all jurisdictions involved is an impossible task. It is difficult to
measure and even more difficult to theoretically justify. For
example, is “marketing” more important than “manufacturing” for
tax purposes?
Taxpayers were quick to identify opportunities in this new
reality and engage in “income shifting” through “transfer
pricing,”153 “tax arbitrage,” and other techniques. “Income
shifting” refers to the ability of taxpayers to legally shift income to
a low tax jurisdiction, which is neither the jurisdiction where
income is substantively created nor the jurisdiction where the
taxpayer who is the beneficial owner of the income resides
(sometimes referred to as “stateless income”).154 “Income shifting”
became one of the defining problems of corporate taxation in the
modern economy155 and prompted the OECD Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, announced in 2013.156 The BEPS
150. Marian, supra note 144, at 1618–28.
151. See generally Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising TaxElectivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377 (2011).
152. See generally Lawrence Lokken, What Is this Thing Called Source?, INT’L TAX J., May–
June 2011, at 25.
153. Transfer pricing is the “pricing of transactions between related entities for goods,
services, intangible property transfers, rents, and loans.” MARC. M. LEVEY, STEVEN C. WRAPPE
& KERWIN CHUNG, TRANSFER PRICING: RULES, COMPLIANCE AND CONTROVERSY 1 (2001).
154. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 703 (2001).
155. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 7 (2013).
156. The BEPS project’s purpose was to offer remedies for BEPS. Press Release, OECD,
Closing Tax Gaps—OECD Launches Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (July
19, 2013), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/closing-tax-gaps-oecd-launches-action-planon-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting.htm.
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project is by far the most comprehensive international coordinated
effort at addressing tax avoidance and has brought about
meaningful shifts in international tax policies.157 A follow-up
OECD project recently resulted in a global agreement imposing
new taxing models and a global minimum tax.158 This agreement is
described as “[t]he most sweeping overhaul of the international tax
system in a century.”159
To better understand income shifting and how it utilizes tax
arbitrage, consider the following example. The United States
determines the place of tax residence of corporations based on the
place of incorporation.160 Before a recent change in law (largely as a
result of international pressure),161 Ireland determined the tax
residence based on the location of management.162 If a corporation
was incorporated in Ireland but the management team was in the
California Bay Area, the corporation was a tax resident nowhere.
Under U.S. law it is an Irish corporation. Under Irish law it is a
U.S. corporation. Neither of the two countries could assert
residence-based taxing jurisdiction over the entity. This, in broad
terms, was Apple’s international tax structure until the late 2000s.163
157. Mason, supra note 127, at 354 (“BEPS reflected—and to a significant extent
operationalized—major changes in the participants, agenda, institutions, norms, and legal
instruments of international tax.”).
158. Press Release, OECD, International Community Strikes a Ground-Breaking Tax
Deal for the Digital Age (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/internationalcommunity-strikes-a-ground-breaking-tax-deal-for-the-digital-age.htm [hereinafter 2021
OECD Press Release].
159. Alan Rappeport & Liz Alderman, A Global Deal Aimed at Ending Tax Havens Gains
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/
global-minimum-tax.html.
160. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(4).
161. See, e.g., Sam Schechner, Ireland to Close ‘Double Irish’ Tax Loophole, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
14, 2014, 4:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ireland-to-close-double-irish-taxloophole-1413295755 (“Ireland’s decision to close the loophole follows heavy pressure from
other governments and the European Union amid a broader effort to update tax rules written
before the Internet era.”).
162. For a discussion of the 2015 change of corporate residence rules in Ireland, see Joe
Duffy and Shane Hogan, Ireland: Change to Irish Corporate Residence Rules, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec.
16, 2014), https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/b1f9jzjxnvm77q/irelandchanges-to-irish-corporate-residence-rules.
163. See Memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin & Sen. John McCain to Members of the
Permanent
Subcomm.
on
Investigations
(May
21,
2013),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EXHIBIT%201a%20%20Subcommittee%20Memo%20on%20Offshore%20Profit%20Shifting%20&%20Apple%20
(May%2021%202013).pdf.

538

539

Taxing Data

Two Apple subsidiaries were incorporated in Ireland and managed
from California, with the boards meeting in Bermuda.164 One of the
subsidiaries, Apple Operations International, owned Apple’s
intellectual property right for Europe and the Middle East, and—
between 2009 and 2012—collected over $30 billion dollars in
royalties from Apple subsidiaries elsewhere.165 The income was a
result of intellectual property (IP) developed in the United States
and incorporated in Apple products sold abroad. Yet the income
was taxed nowhere.166
The result is the reduction of taxation on corporate income and,
as a consequence, on the owners of capital. There is plenty of
empirical evidence demonstrating how corporate income is shifted
to low tax jurisdictions. Gabriel Zucman, for example, estimated in
2015 that the revenue cost from income shifting is $130 billion
from strategies applied by U.S. firms alone.167 Kimberly Clausing
estimated that figure to be anywhere between $61 billion and
$117 billion.168
Dispersion made it very hard to identify the source of value
creation and the residence of value owners. Even if one could do
so, dispersion combined with globalization allowed taxpayers to
easily, and legally, avoid tax on their income.
3. Intangible-ization and “Capital’s Vanishing Act”169
The third historical process that challenges the traditional
income tax models is the digitalization of the world economy. We
are not just talking here about a change to the nature of investment
over time, but rather about a complete qualitative transformation
of capitalism.
During most of the twentieth century, “even in the most
developed countries, intangible investment was something of a
sideshow.”170 The rise of computing power, the invention of the
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX
HAVENS 4 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2015) (2013).
168. Kimberly A. Clausing, How Big Is Profit Shifting? 14 (May 17, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503091.
169. HASKEL & WESTLAKE, supra note 13, at 15–35.
170. Id. at 24.
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internet, and the ascent of tech-centered firms brought about a shift
in investment behavior, with more capital directed toward
intangible assets. This “digitalization” of the world economy is well
documented.171 But it was not until the mid-1990s that intangible
investment actually overtook tangible investment in the United
States.172 In the United Kingdom this did not happen until the late
1990s,173 and in several European countries it still has not
happened.174 The significant shift from a tangible to an intangible
economy is a recent phenomenon. Haskel and Westlake described
this as a shift to “Capitalism without Capital,” and described
intangible-ization as “Capital’s Vanishing Act.”175
These changes are significant, because the market structures
they create are qualitatively different from market structures that
were in place when income tax was first designed. To begin with, it
is difficult to measure intangible investment. As Haskel and
Westlake explain, the conventional accounting practice is not to
measure intangible investment, such as creating a long-term capital
asset.176 “[T]here is no market where you can see the raw value of
its investment in developing better software or redesigning its user
interface.”177 This makes the immediate theoretical challenge to
income taxation obvious: If we cannot measure investment, how
can we measure the return on investment—namely, the “gain”
subject to income taxation? This makes it impossible to measure
one of the components of the income formula: “savings.”
Moreover, “the basic economic properties of intangibles make
an intangible-rich economy behave differently from a tangible-rich
[economy].”178 Haskel and Westlake offer the following as unique
traits of an intangible economy. First, intangible investments
“tend[] to represent a sunk cost.”179 Investors can generally sell
their tangible assets. It is much harder to sell intangible
investments. The reason is that much of the investment put into

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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Id. at 23–27 (describing the rise of intangible investment around the world).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. 26–27.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
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intangible assets does not actually create a valuable asset. Not all
research creates patent, and not all new medications work. Even if
some intangible asset is created, it is very likely tailored to the
specific needs of the firm that created it.180 For example, Peloton
likely invests significant amounts in the development of its
propriety screen interface, but the interface is useless without the
stationary bike it is attached to. This suggests that most intangible
assets do not have a stand-alone objective market price.
This creates insurmountable tax administration challenges. The
reason is that much of the taxation of multinational corporations
heavily depends on attempts to identify “fair market value” for
their intangible assets for “transfer pricing” purposes. Transfer
pricing refers to the practice of affiliated entities to set intercompany transfer prices of goods in a way that saves tax. For
example, consider the run of the mill tax planning relating to the
use of intangibles. A U.S.-based parent company performs research
and development in its labs in the United States (and, of course,
deducts the research costs). The resulting asset (say, a patent) is
then being “sold” to a subsidiary in a tax haven, where the
subsidiary is free to collect royalties for the use of the patent,
without being subject to income tax. In order to determine the
gain to the Parent from the sale of the patent to the subsidiary, one
must calculate the difference between the sales price of the patent
to the subsidiary, and the “tax basis” (or investment) of the Parent
in the patent.181
Both components of this equation are largely meaningless. As
noted above, it is almost impossible to measure the amount of
intangible investment, which we must do in order to calculate the
tax basis for income tax purposes. Even more problematic is an
attempt to identify the “sale price” to the subsidiary. There is no
comparable asset in the market, and there is no objective “price.”182
The Parent is left to determine the transfer price at which it sells the
patent to its own subsidiary. The Parent is incentivized to declare
as low price as possible in order to minimize the gain subject to tax
in the United States. The result is an extremely complex legal
system aimed at trying to prevent such abuse by identifying “arm’s
180. Id. at 8–9.
181. 26 U.S.C. § 1001.
182. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of
U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 149 (1995).
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length” prices, at which related companies are assumed to trade
among themselves for tax purposes.183 But the reality is that no such
price exists. The bottom line is that in the absence of such objective
values for intangible assets, determining the taxable income they
generate becomes, in effect, a guessing game.
The practice of transfer pricing as it relates to intangibles is one
of the most challenging aspects of our current income tax system.184
When the Arm’s Length standard was first introduced,
intercompany transactions dealt mostly with tangible assets.
Comparable prices were generally available.185 Today, however,
“in those situations arising in the majority of transfer pricing cases,
where there are no comparables . . . it will be impossible to find the
‘right’ transfer price.”186 The use of the Arm’s Length Standard in
an economy where arm’s length prices do not exist leads to
“pervasive uncertainty” and “widespread possibility of abuse.”187
The problem is indeed well documented.188
Haskel and Westlake’s second tax-relevant trait of intangible
investment is that it creates “spillovers.”189 It is easy for the owner
of tangible assets to make sure that they are the sole beneficiaries of
their investment. If you invest in factory machinery, you put a lock
on the door. But whatever intangible you create and sell is not as
easy to keep to yourself, even with all kinds of IP protections.
Competitors can reverse engineer your product design. Or design
something that is just “close enough” but “not too much” to avoid
legal challenge.190 This means that some of the income generated
from the original intangible investment is captured by someone
other than the taxpayer who has made the investment. This makes

183. For an explanation of the Arm’s Length standard, see AVI-YONAH, supra note 124,
at 6–8.
184. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 2, 10–11 (2015) (“Treasury regulations provide detailed econometric methods to
estimate IP values, but these are extremely imprecise, often leading to a wide range of
acceptable prices.”) (footnote omitted).
185. For a discussion of early cases, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 182, at 98–111.
186. Id. at 149.
187. Id.
188. For a summary of studies finding that multinational companies use transfer
pricing to reduce their tax bills, see Kleinbard, supra note 154, at 734–38.
189. HASKEL & WESTLAKE, supra note 13, at 9.
190. Id.
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it very challenging to identify the taxpayer who, in theory, owns
the income from capital and hence should be subject to tax.
Third, intangible investments are also easily scalable.191 This
means that the problem of supply chain dispersion described
above192 is exacerbated in an intangible economy. Coca-Cola does
not make all of its money from selling Coke.193 It makes a lot of
money selling the Coca-Cola concentrate to others, who use it to
produce the drink, bottle it, and sell it.194 The unrelated bottlers
obviously do not pay for the physical components of the
concentrate. They pay for the right to use the secret formula and the
brand name. The IP rights for the formula reside in Atlanta. What
is the economic source of the Coca-Cola Company’s income in such
a case? The place where the formula is kept (Atlanta)? Where the
Coke concentrate is produced (all over the globe)? Or maybe where
it is sold (also all over the globe)? Tax writers had to create intricate
source rules to try to identify the place where income is earned in
such cases.
In an intangible-rich economy it is difficult (if not near
impossible) to identify who owns the income, where income is
created, and what is the monetary value of the intangible assets that
generate income. It is rather astonishing we are still trying to tax
income in such a world.
B. Income Tax and the Rise of Data Capitalism
1. Data capitalism
“The modern Internet ecosystem is largely built on the
collection, analysis, and monetization of consumer data. The
business model popularized by companies like Facebook and
Google operates by offering consumers access to desirable digital
products in exchange for the opportunity to collect their personal
information.”195 Data is collected in exchange for services because
it is valuable to the collectors. Data is perceived as a new asset
191. Id. at 9–10.
192. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
193. HASKEL & WESTLAKE, supra note 13, at 9–10.
194. For a detailed description of the Coca-Cola operating structure, see Coca-Cola Co.
v. Comm’r, 155 T.C. 145, 153–99 (2020).
195. Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94
DENV. L. REV. 145, 146 (2016).
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class, if not a new form of currency.196 But a bit of data is not
an “asset” in the traditional meaning of the term. It has no value of
its own. It becomes valuable when it is combined with other data
and manipulated.
Data-rich markets transform the very essence of business
models. Data is collected and analyzed to predict and modify
consumption behavior.197 It is then being recollected to test and
refine the prediction algorithm.198 It is an endless business feedback
loop. Shoshana Zuboff calls the new data reality “surveillance
capitalism.”199 She defines surveillance capitalism as “unilateral[]
claims [of] human experience as free raw material for translation
into behavioral data.”200 A portion of this data is “applied to
product or service improvement, [but] the rest [is] declared as a
proprietary behavioral surplus . . . fabricated into prediction products
that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later.”201
We live in a reality in which “[t]he world’s most valuable
resource is no longer oil, but data.”202 We increasingly transact with
our data, and companies extract value from analyzing and
manipulating our data. Data is a medium of exchange.203 “Data, it
is often said, [is] the new money,”204 and data indeed performs
some of the basic functions of currency.205
The argument that “data is money” requires some elaboration.
In traditional capital markets “[w]e rely on money and price to
reduce the amount of information that needs to be communicated
and processed.”206 Price is a coordination device. It aims to relieve
the need to individually collect information and process it to
196. WORLD ECON. F., PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET CLASS 5 (2011).
197. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1002–03 (2014).
198. See id. at 1004.
199. See ZUBOFF, supra note 4.
200. Id. at 8.
201. Id.
202. The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 6,
2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resourceis-no-longer-oil-but-data.
203. Ben-Shahar, supra note 27, at 141–42.
204. Id. at 141.
205. “‘Money’ has three broad characteristics: a store of value, a unit of account and
a medium of exchange . . . .” Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: Currency Versus
Trust-less Transfer Technology 7 (OECD, Working Papers on Fin., Ins. and Priv. Pensions,
No. 37, 2014).
206. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 3, at 63.
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communicate preferences for particular market transactions.
Information collection and processing is a particularly difficult
task, especially in a global, dispersed, digital world, where
information is available in huge quantities and can be easily and
cheaply transferred.
But modern technology absolves humans from the need to
engage in data processing. The exponential rise of computing
power over the past few decades,207 the development of
sophisticated algorithms and machine learning, and the rise of
artificial intelligence made the accurate processing of vast amounts
technically possible and relatively cheap. “Rather than being
restricted to the information trickle around price, in data-rich
markets participants . . . act upon the full gamut of preference
information, utilizing the market’s informational structures to
communicate all this data at low cost,”208 and to do so by
outsourcing decision-making to algorithms.
When “money will no longer be necessary as an efficient
information shorthand, one of the central functions that money has
performed in the economy will be gone.”209 Mayer-Schönberger
and Ramge expect this trend to continue and the importance of
money to further diminish as the data economy continues to
grow.210 They expect that the demise of money will further
exacerbate the demise of financial capital and will increase the role
for data as a store of value.211 In essence, they argue markets are
being realigned as “data takes over from money.”212 And unlike
monetary profits, data is sourced nowhere, owned by no one, and
is devoid of value.
In essence, our data-rich economy amplifies by orders of
magnitude—the historical processes of globalization, dispersion,
and digitalization described above. “Thanks to digital networks,
massive amounts of data now can flow quickly, easily, and cheaply
between transaction partners, whether they are near each other or

207. REESE, supra note 35, at 28 (describing Moore’s Law, according to which computing
power doubles approximately every two years).
208. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 3, at 63.
209. Id. at 136.
210. Id. at 136–37.
211. Id. at 141.
212. Id. at 143.
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thousands of miles apart.”213 The data economy fundamentally
changes the role of source, ownership, and monetary value in the
market. It is not just that “source,” “ownership,” and “value”
become hard to define. Rather, in data-rich markets, it is not even
clear that source, ownership, and monetary value are theoretically
meaningful constructs of legal-tax design. It is not clear that they
assist, in any meaningful way, to identify one’s “ability to pay.” If
the underlying theoretical linchpins of a conceptual tax design are
no longer meaningful, maybe we should revisit our conceptual tax
design. These issues are discussed in the next section.
2. Data, source, ownership, and value
a. Data has no monetary value per se. Data collectors believe that
data has value; otherwise, they would not collect it. But each little
piece of data—the raw material of value in data-rich markets—is
useless. In tax terms, a little data, or even many dispersed pieces of
data, do not change one’s “ability to pay.” But vast amounts of data
that can be analyzed—do.
Data collectors are interested in each and every piece of
available data, specifically for the purpose of analyzing as-large-aspossible quantities of data in order to identify and predict patterns.
It is impossible to identify patterns from separate pieces of data.
Only when terabytes of data come together do they become
valuable, and only because they are aggregated. Even if you and I
had vast amounts of data, it would be useless without the ability to
meaningfully process such data.
Where you live, what your age is, and what your gender
identity is are useless pieces of information on their own. They have
no value until combined with the data of millions of other people,
and with data that is freely available, like weather and traffic
patterns. Only then can data collectors predict (or guide) your
consumption behavior, based on your individual data.
Consumption behavior is then monitored, generating “new” data,
which is collected to further improve predictions.
b. Data ownership is meaningless. You may “own” your own data,
but it is in no way an economically meaningful concept. It does not
increase your “ability to pay” your tax. The ownership of “data” is
dispersed among all the people that own it, but only when it comes
213. Id. at 63.
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together, say, on the Google servers, does it become meaningful.
Google may now “own” your data, but you also still own it. Does
this mean your data is equally beneficial to you and to Google? You
were not severed from your data. You still know your age. The only
change is that Google now knows it too. If both you and Google
own your data, have you and Google experienced an equal increase
in your ability to pay? The answer is that the data is more beneficial
to Google, because of the other data it has.
c. Data has no meaningful source of value. And what is the source
of the value of data, for tax purposes? It is probably not where
people whose data collected reside because, as stated, each
individual piece of data has no value. Data collected in the United
States does not mean that the value attributable to such data was
created in the United States.
One could argue the source is where the data is analyzed into
actionable form. This also seems theoretically farfetched. The data
is probably not being manipulated in one place, or even by any one
person, for that matter. The manipulation of data is outsourced to
robots. We live in the age of machine intelligence where we teach
machines to teach themselves how to use data and provide us with
valuable insights. We can probably source the “sale” resulting from
the prediction, but is that a meaningful construct of value? The sale
is not where the value was “created.” A sale is simply the place
where the value is realized in monetary terms. But the value was
created from investing in data, which was collected and
manipulated nowhere and everywhere at the same time, and
eventually led you to purchase those sneakers. The shoe store is not
the place where value was created. It is simply the place where
value is converted to cash.
The data economy also adds a new potential challenge to
identifying the source of income: the disappearance of labor. Recall
that one of the challenges of globalization is the shift from taxing
capital to taxing labor.214 This was a result of the increasing mobility
of capital, at a time when labor remains more or less localized. The
age of the data economy brings about the rise of artificial
intelligence and automated processes that some expect to replace

214. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying discussion.
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human laborers.215 While this argument is not without controversy,
automatization at scale clearly strains the reliance on the taxation
of labor. The data that enables the artificialization of processes that
once were left for humans is globally dispersed. Humans are
geographically localized. Big data is not.
At the end of the day the theoretical question boils down to this:
If source and residence are no longer meaningful constructs in
identifying income, why should we rely on them in our tax design?
If money is no longer the best conveyer of information about wealth
and value, is it still reasonable to use it as the best measurement of
“ability to pay”? If “big data” is a main determinant of value, why
should it not be the tax base?
3. The other challenges of data capitalism
The data economy presents additional challenges to societies
beyond challenging traditional tax models. It is important to note
such challenges, as taxation of data may, under certain
circumstances, help to address these challenges.
a. Privacy. Data collection firms want to know “who is doing
what, when, and where,” and to be able to predict “who will do
what, when, and where.”216 This raises privacy concerns. Data
collection is not inherently evil. We willingly reveal information
about ourselves every day. However, data collection in the digital
age is often nonconsensual.217 Users are often not given a choice to
decide what information to hide or reveal, or who to reveal it to.218
And even when consent is given to a specific data collector, there is
no assurance that the collector will protect the data from hackers or
other unfriendly eyes.219
It is not even clear that consent in this context is meaningful.220
The terms and conditions or privacy settings are either too lengthy
215. See ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME WOULD
END POVERTY, REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD 12–35 (2018). But see REESE,
supra note 35, at 123–33 (discussing how human labor will not disappear, just change in
substance).
216. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance,
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2018).
217. William Magnuson, A Unified Theory of Data, 58 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 23, 45 (2021).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L.
REV. F. 71, 73 (2016).
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or too complicated for the average user to understand. The average
user does not “and cannot effectively negotiate over privacyrelated ‘terms and conditions’ to ensure privacy advantages.”221
Moreover, these terms of service are often offered on a take it
or leave it basis,222 where “leave it” means effective denial of
services users need. Individuals are effectively forced to relinquish
their privacy.
b. Economic inefficiencies. The big data economy creates
oligopolies in which a few companies may “possess vastly more
data than other actors.”223 For example, a 2015 study found that 923
of the 1,000 most visited websites contained “Google tracking
infrastructure.”224 Such actors are in a position to reinforce their
dominance, by algorithms which “learn by doing.”225 In a search
engine, for example, the more people use a particular engine, the
better it becomes.226 By using more data, the engine becomes more
likely to return a positive result to the user.227 This in turn brings
people back to the search engine in a continuous reinforcing loop.228
The more data used, the better the service. The better the service,
the more data used.
These dominant actors play a dual role in “select markets: as
both an operator of a dominant platform that hosts third-party
merchants, content creators, or app developers, and as a market
participant that competes with those same producers.”229 As a
result, they are able to utilize data from merchants and other
customers in order to gain a dominant position on the platform.
Amazon, for example, might offer data analytics to merchants on
its site in order to allow them to reach more customers, but then
turn around and use that same data to undercut the competition.230

221. Id.
222. Id. (“Moreover, individuals do not and cannot effectively negotiate over privacyrelated ‘terms and conditions’ to ensure privacy advantages.”).
223. Magnuson, supra note 217, at 52.
224. ZUBOFF, supra note 4, at 136.
225. Stucke, supra note 36, at 283.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973,
984 (2019).
230. Id. at 992–93.
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c. Environmental concerns. Physical data storage raises serious
environmental concerns. Although the data economy is often
thought of as existing only in a digital medium, it occupies a large
physical space through the use of data centers and warehouses.231
These are facilities that house the servers that are necessary for
large data companies to operate.232 These facilities often span
hundreds of thousands of square feet and contain massive
industrial cooling systems to prevent the servers from
overheating.233 In order to meet the demands of their customers at
all hours of the night, these data centers are up and running 24/7
regardless of the actual customer use.234 Millions of old emails and
unused applications sit on idle servers that continue to run in
perpetuity.235 To ensure that no data is ever lost, each data center is
backed up by a generator that is often run using diesel fuel.236
Worldwide, these data centers’ power usage is roughly the
equivalent of thirty nuclear power plants.237 These centers continue
to grow as more and more data is required to be stored.238 Even
with all of this power currently in use, experts are predicting that
“it will be a challenge for current methods of storing and processing
data to keep up with the digital tsunami.”239
d. Social and political challenges. Data collection has a direct effect
on democracy. The increase in “data-driven voter research and the
possibility of political microtargeting,” as well as the trend toward
voters’ use of “social media and news aggregators that obfuscate
the origin of news,” both cause concerns about the role of data
collection in the political process.240
For example, political microtargeting “allows interest
groups . . . to differentiate their news reports, which may contain
231. James Glanz, Power, Pollution and the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/technology/data-centers-waste-vast-amounts-ofenergy-belying-industry-image.html.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Freek van Gils, Wieland Müller & Jens Prüfer, Big Data and Democracy 1 (Tilburg
L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2020-003, 2020).
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disinformation, to influence voters’ beliefs in their favor in each
subgroup of the electorate.”241 In essence, interest groups can use
data collected on certain individuals or groups of individuals and
send them targeted information (or misinformation) in an attempt
to manipulate their belief systems and drive them toward a
particular political ideology. This type of behavior has already
created issues surrounding the 2016 U.S. election and may only
grow worse as “[m]ore than half of digital news consumers use an
algorithm-driven platform as their main way to obtain news.”242
Since data is concentrated in the hands of a few companies, like
Facebook and Google, the ability to microtarget lends tremendous
political power to the few who control data companies.
Data collection and analysis can be a source of discrimination.
Databases are not free of bias. Data models learn by example. “The
data that function as examples are known as ‘training data’—quite
literally, the data that train the model to behave in a certain way.”243
“[I]f data mining treats cases in which prejudice has played some
role as valid examples to learn from, that rule may simply
reproduce the prejudice involved in these earlier cases.”244
Alternatively, “if data mining draws inferences from a biased
sample of the population, any decision that rests on these inferences
may systematically disadvantage those who are under- or
overrepresented in the dataset.”245 Data mining is only as good
as the underlying data, and “[i]f the data fail[s] to serve as a
good sample of a protected group, data mining will draw faulty
lessons that could serve as a discriminatory basis for future
decision making.”246
III. THE CAMPAIGN TO SAVE INCOME TAXATION
The tax challenges of the new economy have not
unnoticed. Multiple unilateral and multilateral efforts
attempted to address, and are still trying to address,
challenges. Recently, we have witnessed a dramatic shift

gone
have
such
from

241. Id.
242. Id. at 1–2.
243. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 680 (2016).
244. Id. at 681.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 687.
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unsuccessful unilateral measures to meaningful international
cooperation on tax matters, mostly through the OECD and the
European Union.247 These efforts have culminated in a recently
announced global agreement on international taxation.248 It is
difficult to overstate how significant this collective effort is. It has
been described as one of the most fundamental shifts in
international policymaking.249 Countries’ claims for tax sovereignty
made way to meaningful cooperative initiatives, sometimes
resulting in binding multilateral agreements.250 This would have
been unheard of just two decades ago.
This Part details some of the notable attempts to address these
challenges. However, it also points to the fact that these efforts are
essentially repeated attempts to keep taxing income. This is not
necessarily a critique. Many of the initiatives to try to save the
income tax originate from the late 1990s, before the role of data in
the economy became obvious. Other attempts are a result of a
political compromise. It is easier (not “easy,” just “easier”) to get
countries with varying interests to cooperate around a well-known
framework than to create a new one. But it also might be time to try
supplementing these efforts with new thinking—aimed at reenvisioning tax theory in the age of the data economy—and
designing tax instruments for this age, rather than trying to save
old designs.
A. The OECD’s Two-Pillar Approach
Probably the most important international project trying to
address the modern challenges of income taxation is the OECD’s
anti-BEPS project, which “reflected—and to a significant extent

247. Mason, supra note 127, at 364–67 (describing how the recent financial crisis
transformed international cooperation on tax matters).
248. 2021 OECD Press Release, supra note 158.
249. Id. at 401 (arguing that “BEPS both reflected and achieved fundamental change in
the decisionmakers, agenda, norms, and legal forms of international tax”); Itai Grinberg, The
New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1141 (2016).
250. In the wake of the BEPS project, several binding multilateral tax agreements have
been signed. This represents a shift from an international tax regimen that included mostly
bilateral treaties. See, e.g., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED
MEASURES TO PREVENT BEPS (2016). The new agreement reached by 136 countries in October
of 2021, see 2021 OECD Press Release, supra note 158, also contemplates the creation of a
binding multilateral tax convention.
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operationalized—major changes in the participants, agenda,
institutions, norms, and legal instruments of international tax.”251
There is a plethora of literature discussing the BEPS project and
its political, social, and doctrinal achievements and limitations.252
The BEPS Project was divided into fifteen different action plans,
each aimed at targeting a particular challenge to international
taxation. Action 1 was specifically aimed at “Addressing the Tax
Challenges of the Digital Economy.”253 The OECD summarized the
challenges as follows: “The digital economy is characterised by an
unparalleled reliance on intangibles, the massive use of data
(notably personal data), the widespread adoption of multi-sided
business models capturing value from externalities generated by
free products, and the difficulty of determining the jurisdiction in
which value creation occurs.”254
Following the conclusion of the BEPS project in 2015, the OECD
established the “Inclusive Framework on BEPS,” bringing together
multiple jurisdictions to monitor the implementation of the
standards offered by the project.255 Work on Action 1
recommendations continued under the Inclusive Framework with
members agreeing on examining proposals for “a two pillar”
approach, intended to “form the basis for a consensus solution to
the tax challenges arising from digitalisation.”256 The OECD
Inclusive Framework published its final reports on the two pillars
in July of 2020.257 An agreement for implementing this framework
was announced in October 2021.258
The OECD’s two-pillar approach explicitly states that it “would
adhere to the concept of net taxation of income.”259 This framework
251. Mason, supra note 127, at 354.
252. See, e.g., id.; Andres Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, Taxing the Digital Economy Post
BEPS . . . Seriously, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 121 (2019); Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16
FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014). This Part does not add to this discussion. Rather, this Part briefly
summarizes some of the most recent ideas that have been offered that are relevant to the
discussion herein.
253. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1:
2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015).
254. Id. at 16.
255. OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION—REPORT ON PILLAR ONE
BLUEPRINT: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS (2015) [hereinafter Pillar 1].
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id. at 4.
258. 2021 OECD Press Release, supra note 158.
259. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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has probably been adopted as a matter of political pragmatism.
While the pillars may offer improvement to income taxation in a
data-based economy, their very conceptual foundation is
inherently limited, as it requires the calculation of “net income.” To
be workable, it requires the identification of the monetary value of
income, source of income, and residence of the owners of income.
“Pillar One seeks to adapt the international income tax system
to new business models through changes to the profit allocation
and nexus rules applicable to business profits.”260 Under the Pillar
One Blueprint, jurisdictions are accorded taxing rights based on
the calculation of two different tax bases. First, multinational
groups’ income is calculated on a worldwide basis and then
shared between jurisdiction based on one of several suggested
formulaic approaches.261 Second, countries are guaranteed certain
taxing rights in respect of “a fixed return for certain baseline
marketing and distribution activities taking place physically in a
market jurisdiction.”262
This requires the development of a new set of source rules to
identify the countries to whom the taxing right is allocated.263 This
is problematic under the framework of this Article, because it
assumes that “source” is a meaningful concept.
Pillar Two is a proposed set of anti-abuse rules. Pillar Two
“seek[s] to . . . ensure minimum taxation while avoiding double
taxation or taxation where there is no economic profit.”264 The
main concept offered by Pillar Two is the Global Anti-Base
Erosion (GloBE) rule. Under this rule, certain large multinational
entities265 must pay a minimum tax at the countries of source.266 If
such tax is not paid, tax jurisdiction is switched over to the country
of residence.267

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
OECD, STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 2 (2021) (“[S]ource rules for specific
categories of transactions will be developed.”).
264. OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION—REPORT ON PILLAR TWO
BLUEPRINT: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 14 (2020).
265. Id. at 40 (proposing a €750 million threshold).
266. Id. at 112.
267. Id. at 124.
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The difficulty with this approach for purposes of this Article is
apparent. It relies heavily on source and residence concepts in an
economy in which source and residence are not coherent concepts
for purposes of determining value. Moreover, it is clear that the
administration of these blueprints will be a very heavy
undertaking. As the blueprints stand, they cover 483 pages. And
these are just policy proposals, not actual legislative language.
Finally, in order to be successful, they require an extremely high
level of inter-governmental coordination.
The two-pillar framework may indeed improve income tax
collection and compliance. But it does not transcend the challenge
of the current data economy. It is still an attempt to square the
circle—to force a century-old framework of taxation designed for a
tangible economy into the reality of the data economy.
B. Digital Services Taxes
A recent tax design making headway in a number of countries
is the “digital service tax” (DST). DST “involves a tax on turnover
associated with specific types of digital services, for example,
revenue from selling online advertisements.”268 DSTs have been
proposed and adopted in several countries,269 and in 2018, the
European Commission proposed an EU-wide DST directive,270
which is still being considered.271
DSTs are viewed as temporary measures.272 They are a revenue
stopgap put in place until a more permanent solution is adopted
268. Mason & Parada, supra note 10, at 1184.
269. As of March 2021, “Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom have implemented a DST.” Elke Asen, What European OECD Countries
Are Doing About Digital Services Taxes, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/. Multiple other countries are
examining proposals for the implementation of DSTs. Id.
270. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services
Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, COM (2018) 148 final
(Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
271. Gavin Bade & Doug Palmer, EU Ready To Impose Digital Services Tax, POLITICO (Oct.
19, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2020/10/19/
eu-ready-to-impose-digital-services-tax-791044 (noting the Executive Vice President of the
European Commission stated the Commission “stand[s] ready to come forward with a
digital taxation proposal at the EU level”).
272. Mason & Parada, supra note 10, at 1188 (DST directives “represent a temporary
stage on the way to more thorough harmonization,” adding in n.34 that “[t]his deference . . . may
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(for example, the two-pillar approach discussed in this Part). The
European Union proposal,273 for example, is rather explicit about
being temporary in nature, until the development of a “‘significant
digital presence’ that would allow a source state to tax nonresident
companies with substantial business activities in the state, even
absent a physical presence or dependent agent.”274 Indeed, as part
of the adoption of the OECD Agreement to implement the two-pillar
approach, countries agreed to eliminate DSTs. The agreement calls
for “standstill and removal provisions in relation to all existing
Digital Service Taxes and other similar relevant unilateral measures.”275
A temporary measure cannot be expected to cure the ills of the
current tax system. In addition, DSTs are clearly conceptualized as
a measure for the protection of the revenue of the countries of the
perceived source of income. They do not seek to change the nature
of income-based taxation. As explained by Christine Kim, DSTs are
designed as consumption taxes.276 They function like excise taxes
on gross revenue from digital advertisement.277 Being a
consumption tax in substance, DSTs are essentially a
subcomponent of income. They are not truly a “new” type of tax.
DSTs also require valuation of digital services, which, as
explained above, is not very meaningful in a data economy. The
monetary value imposed on a sale does not necessarily convey all
information about actual value of data manipulation.278 DSTs also
require an identification of the “destination” of the sale. This, in
essence, is a geographical source rule, which assumes that “value”
is created in the place where the sale happens. As explained,279 in a
data economy, the place of the sale is, at best, a place where value
is realized. It is not the place where it is created.
be particularly relevant when the measure, like the proposed DST, is meant to be a stage in
a larger plan of harmonization.”).
273. Commission Proposal, supra note 270 (stating in the preamble that DSTs are viewed
as “temporary measures aimed at revenues resulting from digital activities in the Union that
would remain outside the scope of double tax conventions”).
274. Mason & Parada, supra note 10, at 1183.
275. 2021 OECD Press Release, supra note 158.
276. Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation on the
Consumption Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 158 (2020).
277. Mason & Parada, supra note 10, at 1183–84.
278. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 3, at 55 (“We like to think that price
allows us to compare apples to apples, but . . . sellers often use price to deliberately obscure
information that would improve market efficiency.”).
279. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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C. Formulary Apportionment
Under a formulary apportionment of income taxation, net
income is calculated at the affiliated group level on a global basis,
and then allocated among jurisdictions based on a formula that
takes into account the location of sales, employees, and assets used
in each jurisdiction. Let us assume that each of these three factors is
equally weighted in the formula.280 A multinational group has 20%
of its employees, 40% of its sales, and 45% of its assets located in
jurisdiction A. Since the factors are equally weighted, the average
of these factors in jurisdiction A is 35%.281 This means that
jurisdiction A will be eligible to tax 35% of the global net income of
the corporate group.
The method of formulary apportionment of taxation is not new.
It has been in place for many years now in the United States as a
main method of allocating state taxing rights over the income of
multi-state corporations.282 In recent years, however, formulary
apportionment was proposed and seriously considered as a
method for allocating the international tax base among countries.
The EU has been discussing an EU-wide formulary apportionment
proposed directive for over a decade now,283 and some
commentators propose that countries adopt the system unilaterally.284
While formulary apportionments may indeed be a better suited
design for income taxation for the current economy, they do not
account for the fact that income is probably no longer the best
measure for ability to pay: they require the calculation of net income.

280. This does not have to be the case, of course. Multiple jurisdictions that use this
method apply varying weights to each of these factors.
281. (20 + 40 + 45) ÷ 3 = 35.
282. How Would Formulary Apportionment Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR. BRIEFING BOOK,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-would-formulary-apportionmentwork (last updated May 2020) (“Many states in the United States use a formulary
apportionment system to determine their taxable share of US-source corporate profits.”).
283. For a discussion of the CCCTB proposal, see COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE
TAX BASE (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2013).
284. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV.
497, 515 (2009).
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D. Robo-Taxes
There have been a slew of proposals in recent years for new
“robot taxes.”285 The idea derives from the fear shared by many,
that various forms of artificial intelligence, anthropomorphized as
robots, are and will increasingly replace human labor.286 The fact
that the majority of U.S. tax revenue is based on labor taxes has
given traction to these proposals. Input from celebrities like Bill
Gates has further fueled news media coverage of potential or
proposed robot taxes, which has further fueled coverage of
potential or proposed robot taxes in the news media.287
Robot taxes focus on an effort to identify a new taxable entity,
which is not human. Professor Oberson, for example, suggests that
taxing robots may be accomplished by granting a tax personality to
robots based on a clear definition of robots, which in turn questions
what level of use of artificial intelligence generates a sufficient level
of autonomy.288 He suggests that a robot tax might first be imposed
on the employer or owner of robots, but that as technology allows,
an “ability to pay” may be recognized for robots themselves.289
Robot taxes may sound futuristic, but in practice they are just
another iteration of income taxation. In the framework of this
paper, robot taxes are income taxes, revised to identify “who” is the
taxpayer that should be subject to income tax. In reality, and as long
as the Cylons290 do not take over the world, it is but a mere proxy
for the taxation of the owner of the robots. Robot taxes assume the
285. See, e.g., Joao Guerreiro, Sergio Rebelo & Pedro Teles, Should Robots Be Taxed?
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23806, 2020); William Hoke, Taxing
Automatons, 88 TAX NOTES INT’L 11 (Oct. 2, 2017); Xavier Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the
Emergence of an Electronic Ability to Pay to a Tax on Robots or the Use of Robots, 9 WORLD TAX J.
247 (2017) [hereinafter Oberson, Taxing Robots?]; Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should
Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145 (2018); Jay
A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax, 10 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1
(2018); Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277 (2019); XAVIER OBERSON, TAXING
ROBOTS: HELPING THE ECONOMY TO ADAPT TO THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2019);
Roberta F. Mann, I Robot: U Tax? Considering the Tax Policy Implications of Automation, 64
MCGILL L. J. 763 (2019).
286. Oberson, Taxing Robots?, supra note 285, at 248.
287. See, e.g., Arjun Kharpal, Bill Gates Wants to Tax Robots, but the EU Says, ‘No Way, No
Way’, CNBC (June 2, 2017, 1:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/bill-gates-robottax-eu.html.
288. Oberson, Taxing Robots?, supra note 285, at 248.
289. Id. at 254.
290. Cylons are the artificial-being antagonists in the popular TV series Battlestar Galactica.
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existence of a new type of taxpayer. This assumption is
questionable at best. Robots are comprised of data. They are mostly
software. They manipulate and use huge swaths of data to make
themselves effective. They are not Cylons that walk around in
physical location and “create value” in that location. Taxing what a
“robot” creates does not solve any of the issues arising from taxing
software. It is not truly located in one place. It does not truly create
value in one place. The benefits and drawbacks of robot taxes are
heavily explored in literature.291 The purpose here is to merely
point out that a robot tax is an income tax, and it does not fix any
of the philosophical tax concerns of the data economy.
E. Excess Return Taxes
Several recent proposals try to tackle the difficulty of taxing
income from intellectual property by creating a tax on “excess
returns” or “excess profits.”292 The idea is to circumvent the need to
directly value IP by assigning IP a residual value.
We can measure the value of tangible assets and then assume
some kind of “market return” from such assets. Any income in
excess of such return is assumed to be attributable to intangibles
and subject to some minimum tax. The United States has recently
adopted such a rule known as Global Intangible Low-Taxed
Income (GILTI).293 Other countries are considering adopting
similar designs.294
As explained by Professor Faulhauber, a tax on excess returns
simply seeks to tax income that has been successfully shifted to a
low-tax jurisdiction where no meaningful activities took place.295 It
seeks to allow other jurisdictions—where meaningful activities did
take place—to claw back such income.296 For our purpose, this is

291. See sources cited supra note 285.
292. For a summary of recent proposals and legislative designs, see Lilian V. Faulhaber,
Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV. 145, 164 (2019).
293. See 26 U.S.C. § 951A.
294. Daniel Bunn, Blending Considerations for Minimum Taxes on Foreign Income, TAX
FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/gilti-global-minimum-tax-on-foreignincome/ (“The adoption of GILTI has created interest by other countries around the world
in ways to implement a similar provision at the international level.”).
295. Faulhaber, supra note 292, at 167.
296. Id. at 179–85.

559

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

simply another attempt at identifying proxies for source in an
economy where source is not a theoretically meaningful concept.
F. Taxes That Impute Value to Data
Another set of proposals aims to tax data more directly by
imputing monetary value to data collected by data collectors.
Under such proposals, data collection will constitute a taxable
transaction, and tax will be included on the deemed value of the
data collected.297
The obvious difficulty in such context is that one would have to
figure out the monetary value of data at the point of collection. This
is not just administratively difficult; it is not clear that the idea is
theoretically coherent. The value of the data when collected is
negligible. It is only valuable with other data. The value that we
impute, therefore, is the value of the manipulation and analyses of
the data. If this is the case, it is not clear what value is taxed at the
point of collection. In the alternative, if the value is imputed to the
collectors’ liability as income tax, it is not clear which jurisdiction
has the right to collect the tax because the source, again, is unclear.
There is an alternative to the income tax and these proposed
solutions. The final Part will present a framework for taxing data
that solves many of the previously discussed problems with the
current tax system and some of the currently proposed solutions.
IV. THE DATA TAX
A. Data Tax: A Conceptual Framework
The purpose of this Part is to start a discussion about a data tax
as a remedy for the failure of income taxes in data-rich markets. To
summarize the theoretical argument to this point: money is not
necessarily the best conveyer of information about ability to pay.
Data may be a better proxy. Source and residence no longer provide
a meaningful theoretical underpinning to identify who gets to tax
value and where.
The Article proposes a reimagined tax on data, which can
hopefully solve these issues. The proposed data tax rests on three
principles. First, the volume—not the value—of raw data is the
297. See, e.g., Florian S. Zawodsky, Value Added Taxation in the Digital Economy, 5 BRIT.
TAX REV. 606 (2018).
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taxable base. Second, the taxable base includes all uses of data.
Third, the data user is the taxpayer.
1. Raw data is the tax base
The tax depends on the volume of data, not on the monetary
value of data. The idea is to prevent the need to ascribe monetary
value to data, which, as previously stated, is an insurmountable, if
not a logically incoherent, task. Instead, under a data tax, the tax
base is measured in gigabytes, not in dollar amounts.
A tax on data volume has the benefit of being self-adjusting.
One of the difficulties of the current tax system (or any law, for that
matter) in adjusting to technological development is the mere fact
that development happens much more quickly than tax legislation
happens. It is well documented that our ability to collect, process,
and transmit data is exponentially growing.298 This exponential
growth in computing power is what enables the creation of new
technologies. Instead of trying to adjust the tax each time a new
technology appears, taxing the raw commodity that enables
technological advances will automatically adjust the tax collected:
the more of it is used, the higher the tax. Thus, as the amounts of
data used in the development of new technologies increase, so does
the revenue. Even if a new technology enables the avoidance of
other types of taxes, some of the revenue will be picked up as a
data tax.
2. Tax is imposed as data is collected and used
Instead of trying to figure out where the data is analyzed to
create value (which is probably nowhere), tax is collected on the
flow of data. In essence, the proposal is for a “data-flow” tax. Tax is
collected on both upload and download of data.
We can measure when data is uploaded and downloaded. Your
cell phone service provider or your internet service provider can
tell you exactly how much data you downloaded, uploaded, and
when you will hit the data limit of your plan. It can collect fees once
you cross the allowable data threshold. If your cell services
provider can do that, so can the government.

298. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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It is easy to measure the flow of data, and it is easy to identify
where it happens. Certain authoritarian regimes can block all or
most of the data flow in and out of the country because data, at the
end of the day, requires a physical infrastructure to be uploaded
from, downloaded to, or simply to flow. If a bad government can
block data from flowing, good governments can allow it to flow,
but tax it in the process.
3. Tax is imposed on the user of the data
Imposing tax on data as it is being used solves the need to
question where value is created. However, there is still a need to
identify the taxpayers who are subject to the tax. Under the
proposed framework, taxpayers are the users of data. It does not
matter how data is used and for what purpose. If you upload data
to the internet, you are a taxpayer. If you download data from the
internet, you are a taxpayer.
Of course, this may raise objections on the basis of fairness and
administrability. Do we really want to tax an individual every time
she sends a text message? Of course not. But these issues can be
addressed in the tax design stage, discussed in section IV.C. For
now, it is enough to say that all data usage, including both uploads
and downloads, should be subject to a generous exemption, where
the tax will be imposed only after a certain large volume of data has
been transmitted within the taxable period. A successful design
would exempt most taxpayers from data tax and will only capture
heavy users, for whom big data collection and analysis is an
integral part of the business model.
B. The Normative Underpinning of the Data Tax
A direct tax on data users has the potential to achieve the
normative purposes of taxation and outperform income taxes on
this issue. As discussed, the income tax was designed as a relatively
efficient, fair, and administrable proxy for the “ability to pay”
principle. For that purpose, it required the identification of source,
ownership, and monetary value. Source, ownership, and monetary
value are not meaningful concepts in a data economy, at least not
to the same extent as in the tangible economy of the early twentieth
century. Tax on data, however, can function as a fair, efficient, and
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administrable instrument of taxation. It also can function to
alleviate some of the externalities of the data economy.
1. Progressivity
The question of progressivity relies, of course, on the design of
tax, which is discussed in section IV.C. But the argument here is
that a direct tax on data owners will, by definition, improve the
progressivity of the tax system.
The reason is that a tax on direct data is expected to burden
most of the taxpayers who were able to avoid income taxation by
shifting to data-reliant business models. Taxpayers who still rely
heavily on brick-and-mortar operations, in one or few localities, are
still likely captured by traditional income taxes. For the most part,
they are likely to be small- or medium-sized businesses or
individual taxpayers. But taxpayers who were able to take
advantage of the scalability of big data operate everywhere and
nowhere. Tax authorities are having a hard time collecting income
tax from them.
Data-rich taxpayers are also the richest taxpayers in traditional
terms. These are the Googles, Amazons, and Facebooks of the
world. It is well documented that such taxpayers pay extremely
low effective tax rates.299
Stated differently, “data-rich taxpayers” are able to avoid
income tax, while low- and middle-income (“data-poor”) taxpayers
cannot. This hurts the intended progressivity of the tax system. A
tax that is focused on the use of data will capture high-volume users
that otherwise avoid income tax. This will help to restore
progressivity in the system. In addition, as discussed in section
IV.C, it is possible (and relatively easy) to design a progressive data
tax schedule where the tax burden increases with data usage.

299. See, e.g., Matthew Gardner and Steve Wamhoff, 55 Corporations Paid $0 in Federal
Taxes on 2020 Profits, ITEP (Apr. 2, 2021), https://itep.org/55-profitable-corporations-zerocorporate-tax/; Erik Sherman, A New Report Claims Big Tech Companies Used Legal Loopholes
to Avoid Over $100 Billion in Taxes. What Does That Mean for the Industry’s Future?, FORTUNE
(Dec. 6, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/12/06/big-tech-taxes-google-facebookamazon-apple-netflix-microsoft/.
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2. Efficiency
Here too, efficiency effects of a data tax are very much a
function of design. But a direct data tax, as suggested here, is
efficient. Recall that tax efficiency relates to changes in taxpayers’
behavior in response to tax. We want to minimize these behavioral
distortions. In theory, we would not want business decisions, such
as where to incorporate, where to build a new factory, or where to
set up the corporate headquarters, to be influenced by tax.
Data tax as proposed herein does not affect such considerations.
The collection of data is not expected to have a major elastic
response to tax. You collect the data where the data is. People live,
work, and consume somewhere. This somewhere is where data is
collected from and transmitted to. This is similar to taxation of
mineral exploration. Activity must happen where the minerals are.
As long as the tax is not prohibitively expensive and there is profit
to be made, activity will take place where the valuable resources
are found.
For example, Google can plan its tax structure in the context of
data collection all it wants—it will not matter under a data tax as
envisioned here. Under a pure data tax, if Google collects my data
when I use its search engine in the United States, Google will pay
tax in the United States. If I travel to Spain and Google sends me a
push notification to try to make me buy something there, tax will
be paid in Spain. It does not matter for that purpose where Google
is a resident, what it does with my data, where it analyses it, or
when and how it monetizes it. As long as Google makes money
from big data, it will keep collecting it. It will not stop collecting the
data just because it is more expensive to do so (of course, the
assumption here is that tax rates are not extremely high to the
extent they are confiscatory). Google will just share a larger part of
its wealth with governments around the world.
One potential counterargument in this context is that in the
presence of a tax on data, services providers will pass the burden
to users by charging users for the use of services that are now free.
This is a good thing for two reasons. First, simple supply and
demand theory predicts that if the price of the use of Facebook
increases, people will use less of it, which some may argue is a
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good thing!300 Second, if Facebook wants to put monetary value on
the collection of information of residents of a particular
jurisdiction—fantastic! Income tax is back in vogue! We can just tax
Facebook using the traditional methods of taxation that rely on
monetary value.
3. Pigouvian properties
As discussed above, the data economy creates a multitude of
externalities. It can have negative effects on privacy, economic
competition, the environment, and the democratic process. Taxes
can be instrumental in remedying such externalities.
A Pigouvian tax, named after economist Arthur Pigou, is a
“tax[] that [is] designed primarily to change behavior rather than
raise revenue.”301 In general, “[a] Pigouvian tax is . . . equal to the
harm that the firm imposes on third parties.”302 The function of
Pigouvian taxes can be seen in the following example: “[I]f a
manufacturer pollutes, and the pollution causes a harm of $100
per unit of pollution to people who live in the area, then the firm
should pay a tax of $100 per unit of pollution.”303 A Pigouvian tax
is intended to ensure that those engaging in certain harmful
activities will only continue to engage in them if their value exceeds
the harm.304
Pigouvian taxes, however, are not always a useful instrument.
When the marginal cost of the bad activity varies, Pigouvian taxes
may be inefficient.305 That is, “[u]niform Pigouvian taxes . . . may
work where there is little variation among taxpayers. Where there
is variation, uniform taxation . . . will be inefficient.”306 Consider
guns, for example.
Most of the social cost of guns . . . comes from a relatively small
number of bad actors. Suppose guns cause $1 billion of social cost
300. Of course, there may be implications for other free-to-use services such as Google
Maps, which arguably add real value to society though free use. It is not clear that decreased
use of such services is a good outcome.
301. Fleischer, supra note 48, at 1675.
302. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93,
95 (2015).
303. Id.
304. Id
305. Fleischer, supra note 48, at 1676–77.
306. Id. at 1689.
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annually, and that there are 100 million guns. Using average social
cost, we would impose a tax of $10 per gun. Such a tax would have
no effect on criminals, whose private benefit from using the gun
presumably vastly exceeds $10 per year.307

On the other hand, when the marginal social cost is equal
among different actors, Pigouvian taxes are likely to work well.308
Since data tax as envisioned here is going to be effectively targeted
only at taxpayers who use data as an integral part of their business
model, meaning the ones causing the externality, data tax can have
the intended functionality of a Pigouvian tax.
4. Administrability
Finally, a data tax is significantly easier to administer than
income tax. It requires measurement of the amount of data used.
This happens anyway. How much we upload and download, and at
what speed, is information that any of us can easily get. There
should be no technical problem for governments to measure the
volume of data flowing through their physical internet infrastructure.
There also needs to be a way to identify the sender (uploader)
or the recipient (downloader) of data, as these will be the taxable
entities. This is also rather easy with current technologies. All we
need is an IP address or a physical machine address. Under a data
tax, it does not matter who, at the end of the day, is the “beneficial
owner” of value. The owner of the IP address or machine is the
taxpayer. You can work through VPNs all you want—the
government does not care. The owner of the IP address from which
data is sent or received is the taxpayer. If a VPN is used, it will be
the VPN service provider who pays the tax.
There needs to be an enforcement mechanism in place.
Taxpayers should not be able to easily avoid the data tax. Since
governments control (or at the minimum, regulate) tangible
internet infrastructure, which is needed for the transmission of
data, they can enforce tax on data. For example, governments can
impose a requirement for owners of any server that uploads or
downloads data to the country’s internet infrastructure to register
their servers. The owner must report data usage (in volume) and
pay any resulting data tax. The government is always in a position
307. Id. at 1701 (footnote omitted).
308. Id. at 1679.
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to force the owner to do so, to go after assets of the server owner,
or, in the extreme, to just block any data to be downloaded from or
to be sent to specific non-paying servers.
C. Models of Data Taxation
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to offer a full-blown
design of tax on data. The main aim here is to make the theoretical
tax policy case for data tax as a replacement or supplement to
income tax. Nonetheless, the viability of the idea requires at least
some examples for potential tax design. This section offers some
possible data tax design ideas.
1. Data tax as an excise tax—the return of the “bit tax”?
A data tax is not a new concept. Tax on data by volume was in
vogue for a very short time in the mid-1990s following a proposal
by Arthur Cordell.309 Unfortunately, this proposal gained little
traction and a lot of bad rap.310
This proposal is referred to as a “bit tax.” The bit tax is
effectively “an excise or turnover tax based on the flow of
information over digital networks.”311 More recently, Professor
Ben-Shahar suggested a tax on data that “reflect[s] both the
quantity and the quality of the information collected. Obviously,
the more information a firm collects about more people, the greater
the tax.”312 Ben-Shahar suggests that
[A] data tax could be levied directly on the people who provide it.
A tax is levied on a transaction and in real economic terms it does
not matter who among the two parties—the data taker or the data
giver—pays for it, since it would be incorporated either way into
the overall price.313

309. ARTHUR J. CORDELL, T. RAN IDE, LUC SOETE & KARIN KAMP, THE NEW WEALTH OF
NATIONS: TAXING CYBERSPACE (1997).
310. David J. Shakow, Commentary, Taxing Nothings: Intangibles on the Internet, 52 TAX
L. REV. 571, 577 (1997) (“The proposal has gotten so little good press . . . .”); Charles E.
McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and
Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 275 (1997) (commenting that the bit tax “seems to be a singularly
bad idea”).
311. Dale Pinto, “Conservative” and “Radical” Alternatives for Taxing E-Commerce (Part 2),
J. INT’L TAX’N 38, 40.
312. Ben-Shahar, supra note 27, at 140.
313. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
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When originally proposed, “the bit tax proposal [was] widely
condemned and almost universally rejected by most governments
and international bodies that . . . considered it.”314
The bit tax was considered an impediment on international
trade because of wariness of extensive internet use, discrepancies
in internet access, and environmental impact.315 This argument
made sense when bits simply facilitated transactions, but it falls flat
when bits are the transactions. Taxpayers are not going to simply
stop profitable data collection because they are taxed. They are just
going to have a little bit less after-tax income. In addition, it is
possible to design certain exemptions to prevent the burden from
falling on certain taxpayers.
Another criticism was that the bit tax required international
coordination to prevent double taxation (meaning the same transfer
would be taxed both to the downloader and the uploader).316 This
made sense under standard concepts of income taxation: income
should be taxed once. But under the proposed formwork, the
transaction should be taxed (subject to any exemptions) to both the
uploader and the downloader of data. We are not measuring
income in data. We are measuring data use. Upload and download
are two different uses of data. There is no need for international
coordination per se. Data tax can be a purely domestic tax. Simply
put, unlike in the context of income tax, “double taxation” is simply
not a thing under a data tax framework.
It has also been suggested that tax on data is inefficient and
would cause distortion in the measuring of taxable value, because
not all data is valued the same.317 Some data is more valuable than
others, so why tax all the same? Under the theoretical framework
presented here, this is exactly the reason not to try to value data and
to instead tax it based on volume. If the economy moves away from
measuring value in monetary terms to measuring value in data
volume, so should the tax system.
Finally, it was also argued that administration would be
difficult in terms of measuring the volume and collecting the tax.318
This may have been the case, as it reflected the technology of the
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
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1990s. Today, such tax can be easily administered and collected, to
an extent that the processes can be almost completely automated.
To summarize, an excise data tax is efficient and easily
administrable. And in a data economy it makes sense: data is the
value, so it is being taxed as such—not as a proxy for some other
measurement of value.
The problem is that an excise tax on data is likely regressive. If
tax is imposed at the point of data transactions, it might be easy for
service providers to transfer the burden to consumers in the same
way any indirect tax works, such as sales taxes. There may be
better, more progressive designs for the data tax.
2. Data dividend taxes
Several commentators have suggested a data dividend tax.319
This would impose a tax on companies whose business model
requires collecting and storing significant quantities of personal
information and data. The government would then distribute
dividends to the individuals who supplied the data to the
companies. As an alternative for direct distribution, it is possible to
simply tax the revenue as a “data dividend.”
For example, Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes looks to
Alaska’s Permanent Fund as a template for how this data dividend
might work.320 Alaska’s Permanent Fund is comprised of a
mandatory contribution from oil companies based on a percentage
of gross revenues. Alaska then earmarks a portion of those
contributions in a savings account for Alaska residents and
distributes 2.5% of the total value of the account to Alaska residents
each year, amounting to about $1,500 per person per year.
Hughes envisions the data dividend tax as one on the gross
revenues of “any large company making a significant portion of its
319. See, e.g., Chris Hughes, The Wealth of Our Collective Data Should Belong to All of Us,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2018/apr/27/chris-hughes-facebook-google-data-tax-regulation; Dante Alighieri Disparte,
The Problem with Data Dividends and Taxes, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2019, 12:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dantedisparte/2019/04/28/the-problem-with-data-dividendsand-taxes/?sh=5af2e99315ab (stating “calls for a citizen data dividend or punitive data tax
are getting louder”); Liz Farmer, Should Big Tech Be Taxed for Using Our Data?, GOVERNING
(May 2, 2019), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-tech-companies-tax-datastates.html (“Most recently, California Gov. Gavin Newsom called for a ‘data dividend,’ saying
that ‘consumers should also be able to share in the wealth that is created from their data.’”).
320. Hughes, supra note 319.
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profits from data that Americans create . . . . [which] would
encompass not only Facebook and Google, but banks, insurance
companies, large retail outlets, and any other companies that derive
insights from the data you share with them.”321 Hughes estimates
that a 5% tax could raise over $100 billion each year and that
because data is not a non-renewable resource, the data dividend
fund could be disbursed in full every year.322
There have been some legislative proposals in this vein. For
example, in March 2017, Washington representative Norma Smith
proposed the addition of a 3.3% business and occupation tax “on
gross receipts from the sale of personal data relating to Washington
state residents” with an eye toward modernizing the Washington
tax code.323 In proposing HB 1904, an additional sales tax targeting
the sale of personal information, Representative Smith pointed to a
2013 Congressional Report on the U.S. data broker industry and
recent findings that data brokerage had already become a multibillion dollar industry.324
The bill passed through Washington’s House Committee on
Technology and Economic Development.325 However, it was illreceived at a public hearing of the House Committee on Finance,
where representatives from TechNet, the Association of
Washington Business, the Consumer Data Industry Association,
the Washington Bankers Association, and CompTIA testified
against the bill.326
Two bills were recently introduced in New York.327 They
propose to add an additional 5% tax on the gross income of
corporations that derive income from the data individuals of New
York share with corporations. Neither bill has seen much traction.
Data dividend taxes seem to have some equitable potential, as
their effect is to increase the tax burden on data collectors and
distribute the proceeds to consumers. The main difficulty with a
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. John Stang, Proposed State Tax on Sale of Personal Data Faces a Fight from Business
Groups, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 11, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2017/proposedstate-tax-sale-personal-data-faces-fight-business-groups/.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. S.B. 6102, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Assemb. B. 09112, 2020 Assemb.,
2019–2020 Sess. (N.Y. 2020).
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data tax is the need to assess value on data collected from people
within a specific territory. It requires some measure of gross income
(in monetary value) on which tax will be assessed. In that sense, it
looks like a proxy to the value of data, which, in turn, seems like a
proxy for income tax. The gross revenue then needs to be allocated
among the various jurisdictions in which data is collected, which
requires a source rule.
3. Data-sharing mandates
Some have suggested a per se data tax—that is, tax paid in data.
For example, Mayer-Schöneberger and Ramge propose that
“[g]overnments might consider a partial payment of taxes in data
rather than money.”328 They envision anonymized data sets
provided by companies that benefit from data. For example, they
propose that car manufacturers might provide the public with
“anonymized sensor data from their cars.”329
Such ideas, while representing a direct tax on data, are unlikely
to succeed. The first problem is that they assume that there exists
an “arm’s length price” or “value” for shared data. Consider data
on driving behavior: the same bulk of data has completely different
utility in the hands of, say, Toyota, than it has in the hands of the
government. Toyota may use the data to improve driver experience
and passenger comfort. The government may use the data to
improve road safety. Toyota and the government use the data on
two completely separate utility functions. In such a case, it would
be impossible to decide “how much” data sharing is enough to
satisfy the tax liability.
This reflects the fact that even though data is referred to as the
“new money,” it does not, in fact, function as money. Data
successfully performs only one function of money: it is a unit of
exchange. It does not perform the other functions of money: it is not
a unit of account, nor it is a store of value. The reason is that data
accounting and value are subjective. They depend on what you can
do with the data. Data has no objective value. Governments cannot
possibly successfully administer tax systems where tax payments
do not possess objective value. At least in the foreseeable future,
governments will still have to collect taxes in fiat currencies.
328. MAYER-SCHÖNEBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 3, at 199.
329. Id.
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Data-sharing proposals are also inherently inequitable.
Wealthy firms that monetize our data will be exempt from some of
their taxes paid in money. They will keep more of their monetary
gains, while the rest of us—all individual taxpayers—will keep
paying taxes with hard money. The government already knows my
address, my driver’s license number, and who am I married to. It is
unlikely the government will let me pay less taxes in money on
account of me sharing information that I share with the government
already. A data-sharing tax is regressive.
A data-sharing tax is also inefficient. It will create huge
incentives for companies to play the line between taxes they pay in
money and taxes they pay in data. If companies believe that certain
data is particularly valuable, with a potential for future scalability
to profit, they will try to keep it for themselves. Companies will do
their best to load the government with useless data and claim that
by doing so they satisfy their tax liability.
It is also unclear what the government is expected to do with
the data it collects from companies. Do we expect the companies to
share with the government their proprietary algorithms for
analyzing the data? And if not, what good would the data do for
the government?
As far as tax policy is concerned, the data-sharing mandate is
simply a bad idea.
4. Surrogate taxes on data
It is conceptually possible to impose a data tax as a surrogate
tax. Rather than tax the ultimate users of data, we can impose the
tax on the owners of data infrastructure through which data is
transmitted. The more data is transmitted, the higher the tax. In this
instance as well, it is reasonable to expect that owners of data
infrastructure will largely transfer the cost of the data to their
customers. In such a case, taxing internet infrastructure is a form of
a “surrogate tax” that achieves similar results.
This proposal views data taxes as data consumption taxes.
Such taxes can be relatively efficient and administrable. They are
administrable because they are collected at the point of transaction.
They are efficient because there is little that the end data giver or
collector can do to avoid them other than not giving its data. But
since such taxes can be transferred to consumers, they may have
regressive effects.
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It is worth noting that proposals in this vein have been
considered and explicitly rejected in the United States. Such a tax
would be illegal. In an effort to “establish a national policy against
State and local interference with interstate commerce on the
Internet or online services, and to exercise congressional
jurisdiction over interstate commerce by establishing a moratorium
on the imposition of exactions that would interfere with the free
flow of commerce via the Internet,” Congress passed the Internet
Tax Freedom Act of 1998.330 The Act prohibited, for a three-year
period, state and local governments from imposing new taxes on
imposing either new “[t]axes on Internet access” or “[m]ultiple or
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”331 During this threeyear period, state and local governments could not “impose their
sales tax on the monthly payments that consumers make to their
Internet service provider in exchange for access to the Internet.”332
“The Act had a grandfather clause allowing states that already
taxed Internet access to continue enforcing those taxes.”333 After
extending the Act eight times, Congress passed the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 , which made the
Internet Tax Freedom Act permanent.334 The states previously
grandfathered in could continue taxing internet access only until
June 30, 2020.335
5. Direct data tax
There is no inherent reason to envision data taxes as indirect
transaction taxes. It is possible to impose tax on data collectors
without the need to explore each data transaction separately.
Instead, the tax can be imposed on the entire data collected from
whatever “source,” which, in essence, makes it a direct tax on the
data collectors. In such a case, it is difficult for the data collector to

330. H.R. 3529, 105th Cong. (1998) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
331. Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 Statutory Note (2018); Internet
Tax Freedom Act: Internet Access Taxation, S.D. DEP’T OF REVENUE 1 (December 2019),
https://dor.sd.gov/media/qmbavimi/internet-tax-freedom-act.pdf.
332. JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43772, THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT:
IN BRIEF (2016).
333. Internet Tax Freedom Act: Internet Access Taxation, S.D. DEP’T OF REVENUE 1
(December 2019), https://dor.sd.gov/media/qmbavimi/internet-tax-freedom-act.pdf.
334. P.L. 114–125, § 922 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4454).
335. STUPAK, supra note 332, at 3.
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transfer all the tax burden to consumers because the benefit of data
collection is not necessarily equally allocated among consumers.
Under a direct data tax, data can be assessed on a dollar amount
per volume of data collected. For example, assume New York State
imposes a $1 tax per gigabyte of data collected. Google will have to
pay tax on all data collected from New York State’s IP addresses
transmitted to Google servers or transmitted to New York State’s
IP addresses. It does not matter from whom in New York the data
is collected, what the type of data is, or through which machine the
data is uploaded. In such a case, the tax is a direct tax on Google,
and Google cannot easily transfer the cost to users because Google
cannot assess the cost of each piece of data it collects. Google, of
course, could start charging for its services, at which point it will
become subject to income tax in New York State.
In order to make sure we do not capture small-time data users,
there should be an exemption threshold. The exemption threshold
does not have to be structured as a “cliff,” but as an exponent so as
to make sure that once people start using large amounts of data,
they will be quickly (yet somewhat gradually) captured by the tax.
Once a certain threshold is crossed, the marginal tax rate can be
designed as a logarithmic function in order to streamline data
collection tax and prevent cliff effects.
In the alternative, if we seek to disincentivize data collection
beyond a certain threshold, it may be a good idea to create high
marginal tax brackets beyond certain levels of data.
6. Data tax as royalties on data collection
Finally, since data is essentially a raw commodity, it can be taxed
as such. This type of revenue stream is predicated on the idea that
resources located within the borders of the state belong to the state.336
Thus, those wishing to extract the resource must pay a “concession”
to the government for the right to do so. While not technically a tax,
royalties are a common way by which governments raise revenue
from extractive industries.337 Royalties can be collected based on the

336. Carole Nakhle, Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: Evolution and Challenges, in THE TAXATION
MINERALS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE 89, 94 (Philip Daniel et
al. eds., 2010).
337. Id.
OF PETROLEUM AND
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volume or value of oil and gas extracted.338 Oftentimes, royalties
are imposed at a flat rate, but some countries have begun
implementing “progressive” royalty payments that increase based
on some measurement of production.339 That is, the rate increases
when some profit ratio increases.
The same can be applied to the right to collect information on
subjects of the states, events occurring in the state, or any pattern
occurring within the state.
The benefit of royalties from a government perspective is that
they do not require the project be profitable before revenue is
earned and allow taxation of the project from the very beginning.
Additionally, royalties are typically easy to administer.340
Royalties on licenses to collect data avoid some of the
drawbacks of royalties applied in the extractive industries. For
example, extractive industries are highly speculative, and taxing an
activity before there is a certainty of profit can provide a deterrent
effect on investment.341 If the royalty is too high, it could prevent
investment in the first place or abandonment of a site once the
company realizes it will not be able to recover the costs.342 These
issues do not present themselves for data royalties: data is always
available. It is not depletable. There is always more of it to be
collected. It is infinite. Royalties on the right to collect data can
also be designed to be progressive and increase with the amount of
data collected.
CONCLUSION
The digital economy has made traditional income tax models
unworkable. Even with admirable attempts to reform the income
tax to current economic conditions, income is no longer the best
base for generating government revenue in an efficient and
equitable manner. Income taxation as it stands requires the
identification of monetary value, source, and ownership of
income—all of which are largely economically meaningless in data
338. Emil M. Sunley, Thomas Baunsgaard & Dominique Simard, Revenue from the Oil
and Gas Sector: Issues and Country Experience, in FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 153, 155 (J.M. Davis et al. eds., 2003).
339. Nakhle, supra note 336, at 96.
340. Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, supra note 338, at 155.
341. Id. at 156.
342. Id.
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rich markets. With these difficulties in mind, data may be the best
(or at least a viable supplemental) tax base going forward. A tax
imposed on the user and collector of data based on volume would
alleviate many—if not most—of the issues facing modern
governments in raising revenue, as well as help deter some of the
negative externalities data collection creates.
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